This article is the second in a two part series written by Armenian Weekly columnist Lalai Manjikian. To read part I, click here.

Every fall, my father who was born in Kessab, plants tulip bulbs in his Montreal garden, miles away from his ancestral land. I like to think he does so in an unspoken homage to Kessab—every year, renewing his unbreakable connection to his past.

As a child, my first memory of seeing red wild tulips grow in their element were on the raw mountains of Kessab, as opposed to being neatly transposed in a living room vase. It was a significant sight, given the fact that my parents had named me Lalai, which is this flower’s literary name. Surrounded by wild tulips and towering mountains, I too felt in my element, feeling a strong relationship with this mesmerizingly powerful land where my roots originate.

Only a few weeks ago, I browsed through pictures of Kessab in bloom posted on Facebook. I saw the hopeful images of trees beginning to blossom, warm Kessabi hatz (bread) straight out of the toneer (stone oven). Village life seemed to unfold as usual. I caught myself quietly smiling at pictures of children in Kessab dressed up for Paregentan in colorful costumes, with their radiating smiles seemingly untainted from severe civil unrest engulfing the region for the past three years. These photos provided me with a fragile sense of comfort that all is fine on the Kessab front, even as I thought of the current situation in Syria, where Kessab is precariously nestled in the country’s northwest corner, on the Mediterranean Sea, bordering Turkey.

Only a few weeks ago, I browsed through pictures of Kessab in bloom posted on Facebook.

A few days ago, like a flash flood, those images of a Kessab spring were violently shattered. Years of hard labour, sweat, and love left behind following an attack on this treasured part of Armenian history dating back to the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia. The predominantly Armenian enclave of Kessab is now emptied of its Armenian population that has been there for hundreds of years, after rebel forces descended on the region from Turkey.

Houses are being looted, Armenians being displaced. We all know too well this recurring refrain etched in our collective memory, as history coldly repeats itself.

Over the past few days, anyone who has spent some time under Kessab’s magical spell or any Armenian for that matter has been taking numerous stabs in their hearts. Memories flooding our minds, as news trickles out from the region, and as the international community just watches with a blank stare, once again.

Perhaps naively, I always wanted to think that Kessab was untouchable, that it was my only tangible connection to my already devastated family tree, to my past, to my ancestors, at least on my father’s side. My mother’s family from the region of Tomarza in the Kayseri province still stand, but it is was long lost in many ways. Kessab, on the other hand, has always been alive for me. Accessible, it is living, breathing Armenian life, where old and new generations solidly overlap, like interlocking elbows during countless “Garmir fustan” dances endlessly streaming at weddings, baptisms or massarah/perpoor nights (grape molasses cooking feasts). A land where tradition is celebrated, a comforting dialect is spoken, where characters are as unshakable as the rocks that make Kessab.  It is a place that is constantly renewed with the incessant flow of Kessabtzis coming and going to and from this enclave, bringing in the new, but also replenishing themselves with the water, air, food, and unfailing hospitality and genuineness of this rural marvel, still standing tall and strong like its mountains in the lap of the Mediterranean Sea.

We all know too well this recurring refrain etched in our collective memory, as history coldly repeats itself.

Countless lives started on that land. Men and women who perhaps moved on to other parts of the world, where they exceled in various domains, but always carried Kessab close to their hearts, and most importantly, always returned.

It is the only place where generations of my forefathers and mothers graves are marked, where life came full circle on a land they worked hard to maintain and where they now rest. A real gift that no one can afford to lose for a people afflicted with genocide where burials are scarce.

However days of victimhood are long gone. Resilience and survivorhood are practically engraved in our genetic make-up, with Kessabtzis being a special breed amongst Armenians, where will power, perseverance, and determination are defining common traits.

Spring has arrived in Kessab and as long as the wild tulips will pop their vivid red heads out, all the inhabitants of Kessab will eventually return to their homes and lands. All of us in the diaspora who are connected to Kessab in one way or another will visit again.

Who can give up on what they have loved, nurtured, protected for so long? Kessabtzis certainly never will.

State Legislators Defeat Bill that Undermines the Right to Self-Determination of the People of Nagorno Karabakh

NASHVILLE, Tenn.—A key committee of the Tennessee House of Representatives rejected, today, an anti-Armenian resolution initiated by pro-Azerbaijan forces, once again dealing a serious setback to Baku’s efforts to undermine the independence of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh, reported Armenian National Committee of America – Eastern Region (ANCA-ER).

ANC TN leader Bearj Barsoumian with TN State Government Committee Member Rep. Richard Floyd

HR 145 lead sponsor Representative Joe Towns (D) introduced a motion to move the resolution forward, but none of his committee colleagues offered a second in support. Committee Chairman Ryan Haynes declared the motion failed. Tennessee becomes the fourth state in less than two months to reject deeply flawed pro-Azerbaijan measures, joining Hawaii, South Dakota, and Wyoming.

“We welcome today’s decision by the Tennessee House of Representatives State Government Committee to stand strong against the Azerbaijani Government’s efforts to mislead state legislators about the good people of Nagorno Karabakh and their commitment to peace,” said Steve Mesrobian, ANCA Eastern Region Board member. “We are particularly proud of ANC Tennessee and Armenian American activists throughout the state, who spoke forcefully in support the rights of our brothers and sisters in Artsakh. We look forward to broadening our relationship with Tennessee legislators and find areas of cooperation on a broad range of Armenian American concerns. “

In the weeks leading up to committee consideration of the measure, ANC Tennessee leader Bearj Barsoumian rallied Armenian Americans throughout the state to oppose the resolution, with activists meeting with over a dozen state legislators, educating them about the Republics of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan’s ongoing blockade and aggression against the historically Christian states. In many cases, Tennessee Armenians traveled for over two hours from around the state to share their concerns with Tennessee House leaders, including Majority Leader Gerald McCormick (R), Minority Leader Craig FitzHugh (D-TN), State Government Committee Chairman Ryan A. Haynes (R) and Vice-Chairwoman Sheila Butt (R), Committee members Johnny Shaw (D), Deborah Moody (R), Bob Ramsey (R), Billy Spivey (R), Richard Floyd (R), Mike Carter (R), and other legislators including Rep. Rick Womack (R). Several of the activists attending the meetings, including Erik Grigoryan, fled the 1990 Baku pogroms, and have found safe-haven in the state of Tennessee.

ANC Tennessee leader Bearj Barsoumian with TN State Government Committee member Rep. Deborah Moody

Tennessee ANC and community members also met with the lead sponsor of HR 145, Rep. Joe Towns (D), shared stories of the horrors of the Baku pogroms and urged him to reconsider his support for the bill. Rep. Towns refused, paving the way for a Committee defeat of the measure.

“Today’s vote was proof-positive that our democracy is not for sale, as our legislators joined with those in Hawaii, South Dakota, and Wyoming in standing up for truth and against Azerbaijani dictator Ilham Aliyev’s campaign to export anti-Armenian hatred to our shores,” said ANC Tennessee leader Bearj Barsoumian. “It was particularly inspiring to work with the broad range of Armenian American grassroots advocates here in The Volunteer State and across the country–all bound by a deep commitment to Artsakh freedom.”

Upon the January introduction of the measure, the ANCA-ER issued an action alert urging Tennessee advocates to speak out against HR 145. In the days leading up to the Committee vote, the ANCA-ER reached out to all members of the Tennessee House of Representatives cautioning them about any affiliation with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s brutal dictatorship.

The ANCA-ER noted a disturbing pattern of activity, where “to win over U.S. legislators and clean up its image, last year alone, Azerbaijan spent huge sums of money flying former Obama Administration officials like David Plouffe, Jim Messina and Robert Gibbs and over 150 U.S. legislators–including some from Tennessee–on expensive junkets to its capital, Baku.”

ANC Tennessee leader Bearj Barsoumian with Rep. Joe Carr and activist Erik Grigoryan.

Tennessee news outlets, including Knoxnews.com and News Channel 5, reported extensively about these free trips to Azerbaijan, questioning the reasoning behind them.

The ANCA also shared research done by the ANCA Western Region Near East Relief Committee, which showed the important role Tennessee played in assisting survivors of the Armenian Genocide as part of a United States-wide humanitarian campaign. A fact sheet regarding Tennessee’s generosity of spirit is available here.

Special for the Armenian Weekly

March 1, 2014. We are at the municipality’s Cultural Center of Tatvan, a district of Bitlis, close to the city center. There is a poster in the entrance of the building announcing the exhibition: “Bitlis Armenians, March 1-2, Gomidas Institute (GI).”

A scene from the exhibit

Groups of people have gathered in the exhibition hall and are looking at three huge maps showing former Armenian towns and villages in the Bitlis area, with figures indicating population. One is based on Ottoman records, and is dated 1905. The second was compiled with data from the Bitlis Prelacy (Arachnortaran), dated circa 1912-13, and shows the churches and monasteries. The third illustrates the ethnic composition of the settlements in Bitlis province through colored graphics, and is dated circa 1900. Some of the villages were clearly inhabited by Armenians only, and some together with Kurds, with varying proportions. The map legend also accounts for the Assyrians/Syriacs, Jews, Ezidis, and Circassians in the region.

The photographs on the walls show the vital Armenian presence in Bitlis before 1915. We walk around, looking at pictures of women, daily life, monasteries, houses. The largest group examining the maps is made up mostly of young people; they’ve gathered around Historian Ara Sarafian, the founder and director of the Gomidas Institute, and are engaged in an intense exchange. Some are asking questions, someone is pointing to a certain village, saying what he knows about it, perhaps giving some information about his ancestors. Sarafian is busy trying to answer all of them. Among the visitors is a young woman carrying her five-year-old daughter, who points to one of the towns, but her mother tells her things I cannot hear.

This is the first time the Kurds of Bitlis and Tatvan are encountering the Armenian history of their hometown in such a fashion.

During dinner, our warm and generous hosts and hostesses from Tatvan and Bitlis ask Sarafian about the conversations at the exhibition. “The people who came to the exhibition were both curious and receptive,” he answers. “They asked questions about the information we presented. Typically, they began discussing all sorts of issues amongst themselves about what they were looking at. In many cases, they had prior knowledge and the exhibition clarified matters for them. They were very lively and I found the discussions interesting, but not when they were talking Kurdish. One guy wanted to know what Armenian letters looked like, some wanted to know the name of their local churches, others stared at pictures of Armenians in amazement. Many of the visitors had some blood ties to Armenians. All expressed positive views of Armenians as industrious people who had brought prosperity to the region. Some asked questions about the Armenian Genocide.”

Armenians of Bitlis: Since antiquity

The Gomidas Institute’s press release gave a short description of Armenian history and life in Bitlis: “Armenians trace their presence in Bitlis since antiquity. Bitlis was one of the Armenian principalities of the ancient world and continued to be a major Armenian center until recent times. On the eve of World War I, it was a thriving part of the Ottoman Empire with a significant Armenian population with its many schools, churches, and monasteries.”

The press release also pointed out the social and political setting against which the exhibition would take place: “In recent years, with the Kurdish opening, it has become possible to talk about Armenians again. The Turkish state has even made a somewhat cynical gesture in the east by renovating the ancient church of Sourp Khatch on the island of Aghtamar and turning it into a museum—while hundreds of comparable sites have continued to be neglected and destroyed. However, Kurdish politicians have been more honest and forthright. They have condemned the persecution of Armenians, apologized for the role played by Kurds in those persecutions, and sought reconciliation by speaking the truth. In Diyarbekir, the local authorities have supported the renovation of the church of Sourp Giragos, returned it to Armenians as their place of worship, and offered their hand of friendship. It is against such a background that the Gomidas Institute and its friends in Turkey have organized a public exhibition about the Armenians of Bitlis before 1915. This exhibition, displaying original maps of the Armenian presence in the region and photographs, will take place in Tatvan, on the shores of Lake Van, on 1-2 March and travel to different communities in the Armenian Diaspora.”

Me, Meral, and Renan—three women from the Human Rights Association (HRA), Istanbul Branch, the Committee Against Racism and Discrimination—proud of our close cooperation with the Gomidas Institute since 2005, didn’t hesitate to support this initiative, and accompanied Ara Sarafian on his trip first to Diyarbakir (where the exhibition materials were printed and prepared) and then to Tatvan.

Hishyar Barzan Sherefhanoglu, the great-grandson of the very old and aristocratic family “Sherefhanogullari,” was waiting for us at the hotel in Tatvan. He was Sarafian’s contact person in Bitlis, and had arranged the exhibition hall and made all of the preparations. With him was a father and young daughter from Bitlis. The father, Shahin Choban, was the former head of the Bitlis organization of the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), and is still a member of the executive committee. The daughter, Betul Choban, a young girl with an Islamic-style headscarf, greeted us warmly; she is a young Kurdish academic teaching Kurdish language and culture to the members of the Diyarbakir and Bitlis bar associations.

The father and daughter were very upset that we had chosen to stay in a hotel and not with them at their home (a typical local sensitivity and generosity towards guests). In the lobby, despite being tired after a long day in Diyarbakir (and then a three-and-a-half-hour drive along a narrow, winding road between high rugged mountains and through a harsh snow storm), a warm talk started amongst us.

Shahin Choban’s paternal grandmother was Armenian; she survived the genocide by sheer chance. His daughter Betul told the story: She was from a nearby village. A stream crossed the village dividing it into two, the upper and lower villages. She was visiting somebody at the other side of the stream when her own neighbourhood was forcefully evacuated. She found her door sealed with no word from her two small kids and husband thereafter. She never heard of them and never knew what happened to them until the end of her life. A Muslim man took her for a wife and changed her name to Fatma.

“What was her Armenian name?” we asked. Betul’s dark eyes looked at us sadly: “She never told us. ‘Nene’ never spoke. She turned her back to everything in life. I only remember her softly singing a lullaby under her breath and then, when it was over, she would take a deep breath and sound a painful ‘Ahhhhhh’ from deep inside.” Ah… It is an exclamation of sorrow shared by Muslim and non-Muslim peoples of Asia Minor alike.

Members of the Choban family were all engaged in the Kurdish political movement. All four children were well educated and had a deep national and political awareness. All were also very much interested in the Armenian history of their hometown—curious, willing to learn more, and supportive of activities against genocide denial.

Betul never left Sarafian’s side even for a moment the day during the exhibition, translating Kurdish comments into Turkish for him.

‘Ez Qurbana te bim’: I could die for you

On March 1, the first day of the exhibition, two new BDP local election offices were opened, and a rally was organized with the “Peace Mothers,” as they call them—the mothers of Kurdish guerillas, some killed, some lost; their families do not know of their whereabouts. It was easy to identify them from a distance, because all of the Peace Mothers wore large and long white shawls to cover their heads and shoulders, made of very thin cotton. The highpoint of the day—a day full of warm reception and stories of Islamized Armenian grandmas and grandpas—was when one of the Peace Mothers came, almost stormed in, went up to Sarafian, hugged him tightly, and with tears in her eyes said, “Ez Qurbana te bim” in Kurdish, which literally means, “I would die for you,” a powerful expression of affection. The word Qurban/Kurban is a common word in Turkish, Kurdish, and the local Armenian dialect and signifies “sacrifice.” While still holding him, she continued to speak in Kurdish, with Betul trying to catch up with her words to translate them to Sarafian. “Welcome my dear son. Thank you for bringing this to us. How happy I am to see you here. Your people are my people… My grandfather was Armenian… You look so much like my uncle. He was dark-skinned just like you with dark eyebrows and eyes.”

The woman was crying and Sarafian, no matter how hard he tried (it was quite apparent) couldn’t stop the flow of his tears, either. And at that moment I looked around and saw many people around them crying as well. It was as if a bright spotlight had illuminated these two persons, one an old Kurdish mother and the other an Armenian historian. Later in the hotel, Sarafian told me not to write about the woman’s Armenian ancestry, “because what made us cry was not our shared Armenian ancestry, it had nothing to do with blood, it had to do with our ability to feel each other’s injuries and a humanly encounter of two sad stories.”

After the exhibition, we sat with a group of visitors and talked about Armenians, Kurds, and responsibilities. A young Kurd asked Sarafian what he thought about the properties that once belonged to Armenians, which now after many generations are inhabited by Kurds, and how, in his view, this could be settled justly. “Some powerful Kurdish families got rich in 1915 because they took an active role on the side of the governent to plunder and murder Armenians,” answered Sarafian. “After the departure of the Armenians, many ordinary Kurds were also settled in former Armenian homes and given land by the Turkish state—even decades later. Over the years, former Armenian homes were also bought and sold as a matter of course. So, the ‘land question,’ as some Armenians raise it, is a complicated issue. I personally am not sure what ‘giving back’ land to Armenians actually means, especially as Kurds are generally poor peasants, who have suffered greatly in the Turkish Republic, while Armenians have become an urbanized people who no longer work on land.”

A scene from the exhibit

He added, “As for Bitlis Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, it is recorded that unlike some other places, the local authorities appointed by the Committee of Union and Progress didn’t even pretend to deport them, the Bitlis Armenians were massacred right on the spot, so that no one was left alive. It was for this reason the descendants of the Bitlis Armenians were usually the grandchildren of those who left Bitlis for foreign countries before 1915 for a better life.”

Sarafian: ‘Justice for all’

Another curious visitor wanted to know what Sarafian thought of the recent apologies made by Kurdish individuals. “Kurdish politicians and opinion makers have been repeatedly apologizing for Kurds’ role in the genocide, but some say apology is not enough, and Kurds should give Armenians back their lands,” he said. The young man seemed quite sincere, without any note of hostility in his tone. Sarafian didn’t hesitate: “I find that there is something insensitive when an Armenian activist talks about ‘giving back’ lands to Armenians. Such statements rightfully frighten otherwise sympathetic Kurds and Turks, who fear that Armenians want to hurt them, to drive them out of their homes, and throw them off their lands—the source of their meagre living. And such fears are readily manipulated by Turkish nationalists and other Armenian haters. I can say from my own experience that whenever I have had a serious discussion of such issues with Armenians, most Armenians have expressed sensitivity to ordinary Kurds and Turks, as well as sentiments for lasting peace and compromise. Any solution to the Armenian issue should be just to all the parties involved, including Turks and Kurds. I think we should seek the truth as well as justice for all. However, we need to create a consensus amongst such people, based on truth, mutual respect and empathy, to carry the issue forward. That is why we need to create ‘peace activists’ to set the course despite opposition from different quarters.”

A young girl seemed excited as she tried to formulate her question: “They say it was not the Turks but Kurds who massacred Armenians. But my grandmother used to tell us how their tribe accepted a whole caravan of Armenian deportees and didn’t give them to the Ottoman army, helping them to escape.”

Sarafian nodded. “The Turkish nationalist narrative has changed over the years,” he said. “For decades, official Turkey maintained that nothing happened in 1915 and that the genocide issue was fabricated by Armenian terrorists. Then they stated that Armenians were a rebellious people who were only resettled away from the eastern war zones as a security measure. Recently they chose to admit that some people were killed during deportations, not by Turks, but by Kurds and Arabs. Of course, this is all nonsense, because the Ottoman state, the Committee of Union and Progress, the predecessors to modern Turkey, organized the killings through various agencies, including some Kurdish tribes, local leaders, and other irregular forces. One good example is the murder of the first caravan of Armenian merchants, notables, and intellectuals who were sent off by Governor Reshit Bey of Diyarbakir. He personally organized the caravan to be sent off under government escort, handed over to a Kurdish brigand leader, and murdered. Most Kurds were probably bystanders, and many Kurds also saved Armenians. Not all Kurds participated in the mass murder of Armenians. In some cases, entire tribes were ordered by their leaders to actively save Armenians in places like Beshiri (near Diyarbakir) and Mutki (near Bitlis).”

‘Khatchkars’ of the village Bor

It was Betul who took us to the village of Por (officially, Degirmenalti) on the second day, very close to the Bitlis city center. There, she said, was the Armenian Church, Sourp Anania, which dates back to the 6^th or 7^th century, renovated in the 15^th century. The poverty in the village was heart wrenching. Betül explained that those villages that had refused to be “village guards” (meaning state-appointed militia to fight the PKK) were punished by the state, which deprived them of all kinds of services, roads, electricity, water, employment, etc. Bor was one of these villages. The youngsters greeted us with curious eyes, and helped us get inside the church, where we saw the altar, the arches, and tombed roof. The villagers store their hays stacked in bales, which gave a very fresh, clean smell of grass. There were fascinating khatchkars around the church, about three meters high with beautifully carved decorations. The website http://virtualani.org/por/index.htm has a great deal of information about these khatchkars alongside with the church. It is noted that “Except for the khatchkars at Aprank, Degirmenalti village contains the most important collection of Armenian khatchkars now surviving in Turkey. They seem to mostly date from the 14th and early 15th centuries, from the period of the site’s use as a monastery.”

It was a relief that the villagers were quite willing to speak about Armenians, saying that it was an Armenian village before and they had all been deported.

Armenian heritage and the ‘Kurdish freedom movement’

Before Tatvan we flew into Diyarbakir. The first place we visited was the Sourp Giragos Church, which I had seen and photographed before its restoration—and after, with my colleagues from the HRA, during its opening ceremony and the first religious service since the genocide. In the courtyard now were many visitors, students from the university, and inmates learning more about Armenian masonry to practice in their workshop in prison.

We met people, grandsons of Armenians converted to Islam during and after the genocide, who had returned to Christianity and their ancestors’ Armenian identity. One of them told us how a Muslim family had saved his grandfather’s and his grandaunt’s lives and raised them as their own children, until the head of the family got them married (when they reached their 20s) and built them each a house in their ancestors’ village. Of course, their names were changed to Muslim names. Forced assimilation is an integral part of genocide, but preserving one’s Armenian identity would have meant death for the individual and for the ones who took him/her into their family. The man who had regained his Armenian identity said, “Me and all my family, my relatives, owe our lives, everything we have now, to that Muslim family.”

One of us asked another man, a Kurd, middle-aged, solemn, and apparently knowing a lot about the local state of affairs, if any incidents of harassment had taken place against the church. He smiled. “No, never.” “But,” we insisted, “there may be unidentified persons, even some state-sponsored attempts to upset those in charge of the church.” Now he decided to speak more clearly: “The party would not let. They announced that they prohibited any act against the church.” I said, “Party? You mean the BDP?” “No,” he said. “The Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan,” as in the Kurdistan Workers Party—the PKK. That was the end of my questioning.

I remembered what Sarafian had said when we first met in Diyarbakir: “Leading Kurdish circles, including the BDP, seem to have a better understanding of these issues and have come a long way in putting their cards down and reaching out to Armenians for a just settlement of past injustices. Here in Diyarbakir, they have ensured that Sourp Giragos Church is renovated and returned to Armenians. Where Sourp Giragos had endowed properties in the city, the city of Diyarbekir has compensated them with land of equal value outside of the city—not by throwing Kurdish families on the street.”

Another episode that was quite moving was our talk in the exhibition hall with a beautiful young girl with a black headscarf loosely covering her hair. She told us about a village called Chapkis (which I had seen in Sarafian’s maps) near Norshin, an Armenian village before 1915. She said there was an Armenian cemetery near the village and that gravestones were still standing with engravings on them. “Several times the government wanted to destroy the cemetery and the gravestones. And guess what the villagers did! Each time they came, the villagers gathered and stood against heavy-duty vehicles, bulldozers, and cranes. This was due to the Kurdish freedom movement (a general term covering the civil and armed branches of the Kurdish movement), which raised the Kurdish people’s awareness of the Armenian heritage in the region.

‘We recognize and condemn the Armenian Genocide’

Telling, too, was the book in which visitors to the exhibition could write their impressions. A Kurdish lawyer, in fact the chairman of the Association of Lawyers for Freedom (union of Kurdish lawyers) and the HDP (the sister party of the BDP in the western provinces of Turkey), and co-chair candidate for the Bagcilar district of Istanbul, Firat Epozdemir, wrote: “We [as Kurds] recognize and condemn the Armenian Genocide. But the genocide should not be [an] obstacle to the cooperation between the Kurdish and Armenian peoples. We hope that together we will reveal the truths in the history and stand side by side in a land full of freedom and fraternity.”

***

In the plane flying back to Istanbul, I close my eyes and leave myself floating in a kaleidoscope of generous faces, bright eyes, mostly of women, voices in my ears repeating their commitment to seek justice. And at the same time I see the lonely khatchkars with all their beauty resisting time and human destruction, silent, yet telling so much about a lost world.

The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will meet in Yokohama, Japan, on March 25-29 to discuss its latest and most comprehensive report on climate change. Made up of leading scientists and experts in the world, the assessment body is the premiere authority on the impact of human-induced changes to the earth’s atmosphere.

Lusine Cherkezyan speaks about changing climate conditions affecting Hovk, a village in Armenia’s northeastern province of Tavush.

A draft of the upcoming report has already been leaked and the conclusions are down right frightening.

Increased temperatures are expected to cause major damage to all aspects of the world’s food system within the next 20 years and displace hundreds of millions of people by the end of the century. Unless urgent action is taken, the report states, millions of people will be left without food and enormous strain will be placed on global security.

Such consequences pose a particularly grave threat to a country like Armenia, with its mountainous terrain, scarcity of land, arid climate, and economic dependence on agriculture. In fact, the World Bank identified Armenia as one of the most high-risk countries in Europe and Central Asia to changing climate extremes.

Over the last 80 years, there has been a marked increase in the country’s temperature and a greater frequency of extreme weather phenomena, such as hailstorms, mudslides, and spring frosts. These changing conditions are already affecting the lives of hundreds of farmers throughout the country.

“Fifteen to twenty years ago, you could easily grow ripe raspberries here,” says Lusine Cherkezyan, a farmer and mother of four in the northeastern Armenian village of Hovk. “I would collect 250 kilos of raspberries from my plot in one day alone. But due to changes in the climate we started seeing locusts and irreparable damage occurring. It’s impossible for people to grow raspberries here anymore.”

Lusine was forced to switch to alternative, less lucrative crops such as cabbage, carrots, or beans. She has struggled to adapt to the changes but it has been tough. Like many others in her village, her husband is forced to work in Russia for several months at a time just to put food on the table.

Slavik Zurnachyan works together with fellow farmers in Haghtanak to plan their local greenhouse production.

A few miles north, in the community of Haghtanak, farmers likewise insist that major changes in the weather pattern are already affecting their livelihood.

“The most dangerous issue for us here is out of season frost,” says Slavik Zurnachyan the head of an Oxfam-established agricultural cooperative in the town. “We now have to brace ourselves for the threat of frost in the spring which wipes out our harvests. The weather patterns are unpredictable. You can’t even imagine it.”

Hailstorms have been another major issue for growers in the country. Last May, farmers in the region of Armavir made headlines when they blocked a main highway leading to Yerevan and demanded compensation from the government after their crops were destroyed by hail. A half an hour storm alone is enough to wipe out an entire community’s harvest for the year.

These changing conditions pose dangerous risks for the agricultural sector, which makes up one-third of the country’s GDP and affects roughly 40% of the economically active population.

As the IPCC report points out, lack of action by governments and the food industry have left many countries unprepared to cope with the impacts of climate change. In the midst of the gloomy picture painted by the report, however, it is also emphasized that early adaptation can make a significant difference in reducing the damage wrought by changing temperatures.

One of the main organizations spearheading community-based climate change adaptation is Oxfam in Armenia. Through their Economic Justice program, they have helped establish 18 agricultural and consumer cooperatives in most climate change prone, borderline and poor communities in Vayots Dzor and Tavush regions of the country, providing the most vulnerable populations with the resources to adapt to changing weather conditions.

Both Lusine and Slavik are members of agriculture cooperatives which operate greenhouses established by Oxfam this past year. They have been able to pool their resources together with others in the community to invest in more appropriate agricultural practices and improve environmental conditions. Access to climatic and weather information facilitated by Oxfam (provided through SMS alerts) and the introduction of greenhouse cultivation has also allowed them to better manage production and avoid the damage caused by hydro-meteorological hazards.

For example, although members of the cooperative in Haghtanak were hit hard by hail to their personal plots last year, the collective’s greenhouse crops went unharmed.

“The hailstorms didn’t affect the greenhouse at all,” says Slavik “The cellophane covering protected our harvest.”

In addition to helping build capacity to cope with climate vulnerability, the cooperatives also serve as a source of training, credit, decision-making, and empowerment for community participants, targeting especially women farmers.

Members of an Oxfam-sponsored farmers’ cooperative in Haghtanak operate a greenhouse where they plant crop varieties and practice techniques to withstand climate change.

“People are starting to understand that the cooperative is a way to solve not only economic problems, but more general societal issues affecting us,” says Slavik. “For any one person, it is always harder to solve these challenges by yourself than if you come together with other like-minded people and work together.”

As the dangers of a warming climate become even more apparent, it is incumbent for communities to come together and close these gaps in climate preparedness. Giving greater impetus to initiatives such as the Oxfam’s Economic Justice program is an important step in this direction. The problem is not only one of environmental and food security but, as can be seen, one that has implications for the nation’s demographic and geopolitical security, as well.

There is a lot that can be done to mitigate the threats posed by climate change. But action must be swift if we want to ensure the fate of current and future generations.

Time is not on our side.

Special for the Armenian Weekly

After finally receiving my 10-year residency card in Armenia, I knew the best way to celebrate would be to travel to Arstakh (Karabagh) without—finally!—needing a visa. Although I was one of the few people who still had to get out of the mashootka to prove I had it at the border, it still felt like a small victory.

The author helping prepare jingalov hats

I had farmers to meet, fields to visit, people to interview, and had asked our wonderful host family of Saro and Hasmik if they could organize one additional activity for me: a lesson on how to make the legendary jingalov hats.

For those who have never tried it, jingalov hats is a Karabaghtsi specialty. It’s a flat bread filled with more greens than you can count. I tried it on my first trip to Artsakh after happily discovering it was vegan, and its unique flavor piqued my curiosity right away. When I began asking about it, the information I received varied depending on who I asked; the general consensus, though, was that there are more than 40 wild herbs in it. This would have explained why I couldn’t put my finger on what the myriad of flavors was, but I knew by that point to always take such comments with a grain of salt. I tried jingalov hats from various places in Yerevan when I returned, even though I was warned not to, and of course the advisories were correct: horribly bland imitations with salt and oil as the main ingredients were what was available in most shops. The information I found online about it was very vague and often not true.

Hasmik said we would prepare it together the second night I was there, and that I could collect the herbs with her. On the first day I arrived in Shushi, I went to a small café with my German friend Monika and while we waited for our host family to finish work to meet them, she ordered a coffee and I ordered a tea. What we received instead were two servings of jingalov hats and a jug of red wine. A worker there had decided that would be best for us, and insisted that it was a rule that one could not eat jingalov hats without a fine red wine.

We laughed and dug into what was a very delicious and unexpected meal coupled with a surprisingly good wine, while he confused us with his Karabaghtsi dialect. I noticed one of the women in the kitchen had come back inside with a huge bowl filled with various greens she had clearly just picked. I bombarded her with questions and got the names of just some of the various herbs involved (once they were translated from Russian, of course). Right away I understood that this is a recipe-less dish.

When we finally arrived at Saro and Hasmik’s home, full and a little tipsy, Hasmik said she had already collected the herbs and showed them to me. I asked her about the rumor I had heard of the 40-plus greens and she laughed, saying that it can be more than 20 depending on the season, but it is usually between 15 and 20 different herbs, which I still thought was impressive. She said spring and fall were the best times to make it, as during any other time the greens tend to be too bitter. I was very happy to recognize stinging nettle featured in the greens used; it is a plant commonly treated as a weed, but is actually an adaptogen high in iron. I tried to get more names of the herbs that I did not recognize, but Hasmik had to remind me that there was no specific recipe one had to follow. Still, she had rules about what herbs did not go in. Thyme apparently does not make the cut, for example. Just as I was getting used to the no-rule mentality, I realized there were indeed some rules.

Jingalov hats remains an enigmatic dish that you must come to Artsakh to discover for yourself.

Hasmik learned how to make jingalov hats from watching her mother, and told me she was no professional. Still, she had lots of information and mentioned that it was created during difficult times with the mentality that “Karabaghstin sovadz chi mnoum” (the people of Karabakh do not remain hungry), noting the strong will and determination of the people. She said that was why it was more often translated as “forest bread,” as the idea was for people to eat whatever they could find in order to survive.

Saro recalled reading how under the reign of Louis XIII, peasants complained that they were hungry, to which Louis XIII responded, “Go into the forest.” During the war, the people of Artsakh made the first vegetarian broth of local wild greens, which, Saro shared, was better than any khash he had ever tasted, by gathering greens from the forest. This idea of gathering greens from the forest during difficult times is the same principle that is behind jingalov hats. Saro shared that it was through the story of jingalov hats and the vegetarian khash that he finally understood what Louis XIII had meant. It seems that Hasmik was right—“Karabaghtsin sovatdz chi mnoum.”

After a busy second day, we came home covered in mud and Hasmik said it was time to get started. The first thing she told me was that although some people use a lot of salt in their versions, she believed that greens do not like salt since it removes their water, and therefore used very little. Saro overheard this and said that a lot of salt was tastier. Hasmik politely asked him to leave the kitchen and do dghamartgants work. She cut up all the greens quicker than I would ever think possible, and Monika and I asked how many servings it would make. She told us “we’ll see,” reminding us that it was a recipe-less dish. She rolled the dough flat and put in generous amounts of the cut-up greens mixed with some salt, oil, and pepper, and closed it up.

While it looked simple enough, the moment it was my turn to put theory into practice, I could not even roll the dough thin enough, let alone close it without creating holes. I finally patched it up to meet the minimum standard, and while Hasmik assured me it was not the appearance that mattered, Saro asked me if I had ever cooked before. My confidence was re-gained once Monika (who bakes constantly, I might add) had her try. Hers was so bad that Hasmik made her re-do it and jokingly told her that she would get a 2/10 as a student and I confirmed with her that mine was in fact better. Victory number two.

We cooked them all on the saj pan until the dough was crispy, but it was important that the greens still remained fresh and crunchy. Right before we sat down to finally eat the fruits of our labor, Saro pulled out a wine and reiterated the apparently common knowledge of jingalov hats having to be coupled with a good red wine. Needless to say, as it was the freshest I had ever eaten it, it was the best one yet, and even Monika’s fish-shaped one was a hit (with her). When Saro asked if we would now make it ourselves, I had to remind him that it was a recipe-less dish, since people work with the greens available at the time, add the salt and oil to their liking, and no one has a full list of the greens usually used, just of the ones that shouldn’t be used.

I planned to return to Yerevan with a detailed recipe. But even though I watched it being made, asked as many questions as could be acceptable in a hot kitchen with too many people, and made it myself, jingalov hats remains an enigmatic dish that you must come to Artsakh to discover for yourself. I can live with that!

The ARF Eastern US Central Committee has issued the following announcement pledging its solidarity with the people of Kessab, which has been under siege since Friday when rebel gunmen entered Syria from Turkey and began attacking the population. The ARF has strongly condemned the attack and is urging the international community to intervene and deter Turkey from aiding and abetting  the rebel fighters.

Below is the text of the announcement.

By now, readers are aware of the brutal, unprovoked attacks by rebel groups upon the peaceful population of Kessab. These attacks have uprooted a centuries-old community, consisting mainly of Armenians as well as other minorities in northern Syria, and are the cause of great concern and uncertainty.

We strongly condemn this act of terrorism, which in all likelihood was aided and abetted by Turkey, and which violates long-standing border agreements between Turkey and Syria. While Syrian forces now wage combat in an attempt to drive out the militants, we are doing our utmost to mobilize the international community, especially the US, to pressure those sponsoring this invasion to leave the town to its rightful residents.

Both on the state and federal levels, the Armenian National Committee of America, beginning last Friday, has met with influential US officials to inform them about these developments and to ask that they join a campaign in urging the White House to use its influence to halt Turkey’s direct or indirect role in the attacks. These efforts are ongoing.

The ANCA is also informing human rights organizations and United Nations non-governmental organizations about the fate of Kessab, and will seek their assistance in efforts to confront this human tragedy.

At the community level, the ARF is in touch with our leading organizations, seeking to expand the existing relief efforts, led by the Syrian-Armenian Relief Fund. Our immediate goal is to carry out targeted, emergency assistance for displaced Kessab residents who now reside temporarily in nearby Latakia.

We will continue our efforts, and have no doubt about the support of the entire Armenian-American community.

ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION

Eastern US Central Committee

WASHINGTON—Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) was joined by Congressional Armenian Caucus Co-Chairs Frank Pallone (D-N.J.) and Michael Grimm (R-N.Y.), Armenian Genocide Resolution Lead Sponsors David Valadao (R-Calif.) and Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) and Representatives Brad Sherman (D-Calif.), Jim Costa (D-Calif.) and James McGovern (D-Mass.) in condemning the recent attacks against the historically Armenian city of Kessab, Syria, urging the State Department to investigate the incursion and take immediate action to safeguard the vulnerable population, reported the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA).

Chairman Menendez, Congressional Armenian Caucus Co-Chairs, Members of Congress Condemn Kessab Attacks.

“We would like to thank Chairman Menendez and the many other Congressional defenders of human rights who have stepped forward to call the world’s urgent attention to the attacks against the predominantly Armenian population of Kessab,” said ANCA Executive Director Aram Hamparian.  “We look forward to working with each of them to ensure that Turkey’s role is explicitly condemned by our government, as we continue efforts to secure the safety and return of Kessab’s civilian residents to their ancestral homes.”

In a letter to constituents sent earlier today, Chairman Menendez stated, “Like you, I am gravely concerned by reports of a March 21, 2014 attack on the predominantly Syrian Armenian town of Kessab, near the Turkish border, by al-Qaeda-linked terrorists based in Turkey.  Attacks of this nature are another example of a dangerous new chapter in the violence now engulfing Syria; one where Syrian minorities are actively targeted by Islamic extremists because of their religion and ethnicity.  I condemn all such attacks, including those on Armenian Christians.”

In a joint letter to President Obama, Representatives Pallone, Grimm, Valadao and Schiff echoed these concerns, noting “When coupled with a mass exodus of the Armenian community, these events are far too reminiscent of the early days of the Armenian Genocide, which took place nearly 100 years ago in Ottoman Turkey under the cover of World War I.”  The letter goes on to state, “With the Christian Armenian community being uprooted from its homeland, yet again, we strongly urge you to take all necessary measures without delay to safeguard the Christian Armenian community of Kessab.  We also believe that now is the time to redouble America’s efforts to ensure that all minority communities at risk in the Middle East are afforded greater protection.”

Senior House Foreign Affairs Committee member Rep. Brad Sherman stated that he has “been in contact with the State Department and have urged them to take the necessary actions to assist the Armenians in Syria. Turkey must take immediate action to help prevent extremist attacks on Armenian civilians.”

Rep. James McGovern, Co-Chair of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, explained, “I strongly condemn the brutal attacks on the Armenian-populated town of Kessab by al-Qaeda affiliated armed bands.”  He went on to note that he is “deeply concerned by the reports that these attacks allegedly originated in Turkey and demand that the United States and international community conduct a thorough and critical investigation of these claims.”

Central California Congressman Jim Costa (D-CA), in a letter to his constituents, wrote, “As you may know, al Qaeda-linked terrorists attacked Armenians and other Christians in the Syrian town of Kessab, Syria six days ago. These attacks are deplorable, and I have made clear to the State Department that we must determine exactly what happened and continue to work with our allies to prevent such atrocities from happening again.”

Representatives Schiff and Sherman Tweet to #SaveKessab

Representatives Adam Schiff and Brad Sherman shared their concern regarding the Kessab attacks on social media today, joining with concerned Armenians around the world in an effort led by the Armenian Youth Federation to trend the hashtag #SaveKessab.

Thousands participated in the international targeted tweeting session on Friday, March 28th from 3:00pm to 5:00pm EST, to raise awareness regarding the humanitarian crisis in Kessab and Turkey’s role in the attacks.

“Urging the State Dept. to help Armenians in Syria. Turkey must take immediate action to help prevent attacks on Armenians. #SaveKessab,” tweeted Rep. Sherman, echoing his earlier statement.

“The vicious attacks by al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists against Armenians & other Christians in #Kessab are beyond appalling. #SaveKessab,” stated Rep. Schiff.

State Department “Deeply Troubled” by Kessab Attacks

In a statement followed by an question and answer session during the daily State Department press briefing on Friday, State Department Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf explained, “we are deeply troubled by recent fighting and violence that is endangering the Armenian community in Kasab, Syria and has forced many to flee. There are far too many innocent civilians suffering as a result of the war. All civilians, as well as their places of worship, must be protected.”  Harf continued to note, ” We have long had concerns about the threat posed by violent extremists and this latest threat to the Armenian community in Syria only underscores this further.”

Over the past week, thousands of Armenian Americans have contacted President Obama and their Senators and Representatives in response to an ANCA Action Alert (http://www.anca.org/savekessab) urging immediate condemnation of the attacks against the civilian population of Kessab and, specifically, Turkey’s role in facilitating those attacks.

Located in the northwestern corner of Syria, near the border with Turkey, Kessab had, until very recently, evaded major battles in the Syrian conflict. The local Armenian population had increased in recently years with the city serving as safe-haven for those fleeing from the war-torn cities of Yacubiye, Rakka and Aleppo.  On the morning of March 21st, extremist foreign fighters launched a vicious attack on Kessab civilians, forcing them to flee neighboring Latakia and Bassit.

Text of Pallone-Grimm-Valadao-Schiff Letter to President Obama Regarding Kessab

March 28, 2014

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

We are writing to express our serious concerns regarding credible reports that Islamist rebels entering from Turkey this past weekend were involved in attacks in the Latakia region of Syria, specifically the town of Kessab, which is a predominately Armenian populated area.  Such actions shock the conscious and must be resoundingly condemned.

As the Wall Street Journal reported on March 26th, “For Armenian-Syrians from the town of Kassab [sic] in Latakia, which rebels overran this weekend, the Turkish involvement reminded them of a dark chapter in their history: the Armenian genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman empire in 1915.”  These tragic developments are accompanied by disturbing reports of Armenian homes being looted and occupied.  When coupled with a mass exodus of the Armenian community, these events are far too reminiscent of the early days of the Armenian Genocide, which took place nearly 100 years ago in Ottoman Turkey under the cover of World War I.

At the beginning of the 20th century, nearly 6,000 Armenians lived in Kessab.  However, the July 1915 deportation of the Armenian population at the hands of the Ottoman Turks resulted in the loss of nearly 5,000 lives.  Now, ninety-nine years after their initial deportation, another expulsion of Armenians is a telling reminder about the dangers of genocide denial and Turkey’s failure to address its genocidal legacy.

With the Christian Armenian community being uprooted from its homeland, yet again, we strongly urge you to take all necessary measures without delay to safeguard the Christian Armenian community of Kessab.  We also believe that now is the time to redouble America’s efforts to ensure that all minority communities at risk in the Middle East are afforded greater protection.

Thank you for considering this urgent request.

Sincerely,

FRANK PALLONE, JR.
Member of Congress

MICHAEL GRIMM
Member of Congress

ADAM SCHIFF
Member of Congress

DAVID VALADAO
Member of Congress

Special for the Armenian Weekly

DIYARBAKIR, Turkey (A.W.)—Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has emerged as a clear winner in the local elections held in Turkey, as the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) solidified its influence over the country’s southeast, wrestling several cities away from AKP.

Kışanak voting (Photo: Özgür Ayaydın, Anadolu News Agency)

In turn, the BDP added Bitlis, Ağrı, and Mardin to the list of metropolitan municipalities under its control, which include Van, Hakkari, Şırnak, Tunceli (Dersim), and Batman.

BDP also carried Iğdır, which it had won in the previous local elections (2009). Back then, Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek had said, “They took Iğdır too. They are now attached to Armenia,” referring to the pro-Kurdish party.

The BDP pioneered a system of local government with two co-mayors—a man and a woman—in every city where it ran. The first would be the mayor, while the second would head the municipal council. Under this system, 50 percent of the BDP’s mayoral candidates were women and, consequently, 50 percent of its municipal leaders are now women.

In Diyarbakır, a BDP stronghold, the party secured 56 percent of the vote, as its candidates for the metropolitan municipality as well as the Sur, Yenişehir, Kayapınar, and the Bağlar municipalities of Diyarbakır cruised to victory.

Gültan Kışanak, the co-chair of BDP, became the metropolitan mayor of Diyarbakır, replacing Osman Baydemir, who was, in turn, running for mayor in Urfa, but lost to the AKP candidate. The co-mayor with Kışanak will be Fırat Anlı.

Kışanak is one of the three women who are now heading metropolitan municipalities in Turkey. AKP’s Fatma Şahin (Gaziantep) and Republican People’s Party (CHP) candidate Özlem Çerçioğlu (Aydın) are the other two.

Metropolitan municipalities are provincial centers that have a population of 750,000 or above. They are, in turn, divided into second level municipalities.

Kışanak speaking earlier this year in Diyarbakir during the anniversary of Hrant Dink’s assassination. (Photo by Gulisor Akkum, The Armenian Weekly)

Diyarbakir has four such municipalities, below are their mayors and co-mayors.

Sur Municipality: Seyit Narin (Narin replaces Abdullah Demirbaş), Fatma Şıkbarut

Yenişehir Municipality: Selim Kurbanoğlu, Ülkü Baytaş

Kayapınar Municipality: M. Ali Aydın, Fatma Arşimet

Bağlar Municipality: Birsen Kaya Akad, Eşref Yüksel

In neighboring Mardin, Ahmet Türk won the election. Februniye Akyol, an Assyrian, is the co-mayor.

The Armenian Weekly March 2014 Magazine:
Armenia’s Foreign Policy in Focus

Ukraine has been in the spotlight of the international media since President Viktor Yanukovich announced¹ the suspension of the Association Agreement with the EU, just a week before it was due to be signed in Vilnius, Lithuania, in favor of deeper ties with Russia. The Nov. 21 decision³ sparked a wave of protests, known as the Euromaidan, demanding Yanukovich’s resignation. In December, following a meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents, an agreement was reached for a $15 billion Russian loan and an over 30 percent cut in the price of Russian natural gas, which further angered the opposition that supports the European integration of Ukraine. The, however, issue is not as black and white as the classic case of a people against its repressive government. The country has a stark divide between its eastern and western provinces—the former being generally more supportive of closer ties with Russia, and the latter in favor of Ukraine’s European path. Historical and geographic factors⁴ play a big role in the recent developments taking place in Kyiv and other regions of Ukraine.

President Serge Sarkisian and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Yerevan in Dec., 2013. (Photo: President.am)

Similar to Yanukovich’s announcement on Nov. 21, the Sept. 3 joint statement⁵ by the presidents of Armenia and Russia—announcing Armenia’s desire to join the Russian-led Customs Union (CU)—came as a big surprise to many, especially in the West. It was expected⁶ that Armenia would sign the EU’s Association Agreement with a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA) component later in 2013, yet the Armenian leadership ostensibly notified⁷ the EU Commission of its decision to join the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space (CES) of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia just three days before the official visit by President Serge Sarkisian to Moscow. Official Yerevan effectively made a U-Turn from the Association Agreement with the EU, which took more than three years to negotiate⁸ and was due to have been signed at the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit.

In making its decision between the “East” and “West,” the Armenian leadership did not have many alternatives. Just like Russia, the EU was not eager to allow Armenia much maneuver space. Therefore, Brussels, alongside Moscow, has its own share of the blame in regards to the recent developments. Blaming Armenia for choosing the CU in this case is unreasonable, as it would have been blamed regardless of which side it chose. Rather, the question should be addressed to the EU and Russia, as to why they are so unwilling and incapable of coming up with a framework that allows for the dual integration of the states in the shared neighborhood, especially when both sides claim⁹ that their policies are not targeted against the other.

Considering the close collaboration between Armenia and Russia in the economic, political, and military spheres, news of the Armenian choice should not be entirely surprising. Russia maintains a

President Serge Sarkisian and President François Hollande during Sargsyan’s working visit to France in Oct., 2013. (Photo: President.am)

military base in Armenia¹⁰ (effectively serving as the security guarantor of the state), owns most of the country’s critical infrastructure, is the leading foreign investor, and is home to the largest Armenian diaspora in the world. Having so much political and economic leverage over Armenia, Russia did not face a major challenge from the European side, whose collaboration with Armenia has been limited. Armenia’s chances for a possible membership in the EU are currently close to zero, whereas the CU and consequently EAU membership might prove to be beneficial in increasing Armenia’s international relevance as part of a much larger entity. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned factors, as well as Armenia’s cultural and historical connections with Russia, one can better understand why it ended up rationally choosing the Russian side, when cornered by Brussels and Moscow.

Since the Sept. 3 decision some noteworthy developments have taken place, which will likely change the geopolitical and economic situation of Armenia and the region at large. President Sarkisian paid a working visit to France in October 2013¹¹ and delivered a statement during the plenary session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).¹² During the Q&A session, he touched upon the topic of the AA/DCFTA agreement with the EU, noting, “We [Armenia] are still ready to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union… [A]fter our announcement that we join the Customs Union, our partners in the European Commission said that there is a direct contradiction between the Customs Union and Free Trade Agreement; the rules are different.”¹³

Even though Armenia took part in the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius on Nov. 28-29, and despite President Sarkisian’s earlier statement regarding Armenia’s readiness to initial the AA/DCFTA with the EU, no agreement was signed (as many expected). A joint declaration between Armenia and the European Union following the Vilnius Summit stated that “based on common values, both sides are committed to further cooperation aimed at the continuous improvement of democratic institutions and judiciary, the promotion of human rights and rule of law, good governance, the fight against corruption, the strengthening the civil society, the further improvement of the framework for enhanced trade and investments, the continued implementation of the mobility partnership, and increased sectorial cooperation.”¹⁴ The parties further acknowledged the completion of negotiations for the Association Agreement, but said they would not proceed with its initialing due to Armenia’s new international commitments.

Russian President Vladimir Putin visits his country’s military base (102nd) in Gyumri, Armenia, accompanied by Armenian President Serge Sarkisian in Dec. 2013. (Photo: Kremlin.ru)

On Dec. 2, 2013 President Vladimir Putin paid a state visit to Armenia.¹⁵ As part of his trip, he visited the 102^nd Russian military base stationed in Gyumri,¹⁶ participatedin the Russian-Armenian Interregional Forum,¹⁷ and together with his Armenian counterpart witnessed the signing of a set of bilateral agreements. Putin was accompanied¹⁸ by a 500-member delegation, including 6 cabinet ministers, 11 provincial governors, and heads of large Russian companies, signifying the importance Russia places on Armenia as a strategic partner. Additionally, Russia recently announced¹⁹ its plans to create a unified air defense network with Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states, including Armenia. This will effectively further expand and modernize the latter’s air force. Armenian Defense Minister Seyran Ohanyan declared that “the agreements [with Russia] on buying up-to-date interoperable arms, military equipment, and long-range precision-guided weapons allow us to improve our defense control mechanisms.”²⁰ In short, the economic, political, and military cooperation between Armenia and Russia is expected to only expand in the future, since there is no motive to predict otherwise.

The Eurasian Supreme Economic Council (the highest decision-making body of the CU/CES) convened²¹ its meeting on Oct. 24, 2013. In addition to the presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus, the leaders of Ukraine, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan were also present at the assembly. It was agreed to create²² working groups to develop roadmaps in order to expedite Armenia and Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU/CES. As early as Dec. 23, 2013, the government of Armenia adopted²³ the road map, which entails 262 measures, 150 of which should be realized prior to the accession. The following day, on Dec. 24, the Eurasian Supreme Economic Council also approved²⁴ Armenia’s roadmap.

As is evident from the timeline of events, the Armenian side is moving very quickly towards the final accession to the Customs Union. In particular, Putin stated²⁵ that “we [Russian side] are struggling to keep up with our Armenian partners.” Furthermore, the Russian ambassador to Armenia, Ivan Volynkin, recently said that “Armenia is moving forward by leaps and bounds. Many did not expect that Armenia would be moving towards the Customs Union so fast.” ²⁶ It is anticipated²⁷ that Armenia will become a full-fledged member of the Customs Union by May 2014, before the existing three members initial²⁸ the draft agreement on the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), planned to commence its full-scale work on Jan. 1, 2015.

Developments since September have effectively brought an end to the current phase of Armenia’s “Complementarity”²⁹ policy in foreign affairs, which entailed developing good and balanced relations with regional and global powers. Although this strategy is likely to continue, since Armenia cannot afford to have poor relations with more states than it already does, some of the dynamics will change. By the summer of 2014, the Republic of Armenia will be a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the CSTO, and CU/CES, which means that it will be fully aligned with Russia in the political, military, and economic realms, respectively. This, without a doubt, will place certain constraints on how the diplomatic corps of the state conducts its foreign affairs within the framework of complementarity. The challenge will be parallel to further deepening relations with Russia, to be able to develop relations with other regional and global powers.

Armenia should also look into deepening its ties with India, China, and others—something the leadership has not given much priority to thus far. Further cultivation of a policy inclined to develop and strengthen ties with the east should be one of Yerevan’s top priorities. This will enable Armenia to create more alternatives for itself and loosen its dependence on both Russia and the EU, allowing for more flexibility in its foreign and domestic policies. How they do this is different question, but the fact that we will witness changes in the current strategy is almost certain. Armenia must develop a qualitatively new “Complementarity 2.0” policy that will best reflect current risks and opportunities.

Notes

[1] See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/ukraine-suspends-preparations-eu-trade-pact

2 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/21/ukraine-suspends-preparations-eu-trade-pact

3 See http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/01/140129-protests-ukraine-russia-geography-history/

4 See http://www.president.am/en/press-release/item/2013/09/03/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-and-President-Vladimir-Putin-joint-statement/

5 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-740_en.htm

6 See http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/interviews/7973/

7 See http://asbarez.com/113868/eu-will-not-sign-agreement-with-armenia-commissioner-says/

8 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-687_en.htm

9 See http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20130627/181913865.html

[1]0 See http://www.president.am/en/foreign-visits/item/2013/09/30/Working-visit-of-President-Serzh-Sargsyan-to-France/

[1]1 See http://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2013/10/02/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-participated-at-the-session-of-the-PACE-speech/

[1]2 See http://www.president.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2013/10/02/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-answered-the-questions-of-PACE-members/

[1]3 See http://arka.am/en/news/politics/armenia_and_european_union_issue_joint_declaration_after_vilnius_summit/

[1]4 See http://eng.kremlin.ru/visits/6359

[1]5 See http://eng.kremlin.ru/visits/6359

16 See http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6354

17 See http://www.tert.am/en/news/2013/11/28/putin/

18 See http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20131119/184808436.html

19 See http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/armypolice/8865/

20 See http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6169

21 See http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6170

22 See http://armenpress.am/eng/news/747358/armenias-government-approves-timetable-for-roadmap-of-armenias-accession-to-customs-union.html

23 See http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6439

24 See http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/25244130.html

25 See http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/25244130.html

26 See http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=470566

27 See http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=470566

28 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/02/us-armenia-russia-idUSBRE9B10FM20131202

29 See http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/cd67865d0fcfef431b21f3e4bbe5e020.pdf

ANCA Welcomes Launch of Bipartisan Religious Freedom Legislation

WASHINGTON—House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce (R-Calif.) has been joined by the panel’s Ranking Democrat Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.), in introducing bipartisan religious freedom legislation (H.R.4347) that would require the Obama Administration to submit annual reports on the status of stolen Christian churches and properties in Turkey and occupied Cyprus, a move welcomed by the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA).

The St. Tovmas Armenian church near Van. (Photo by Khatchig Mouradian)

“Americans of Armenian heritage—the sons and daughters of the world’s first Christian nation—join with friends of all faiths in welcoming Chairman Royce’s introduction of the Royce-Engel Turkey Christian Churches Accountability Act,” said ANCA Chairman Ken Hachikian.

“The need for strong American leadership in defense of minority rights and religious freedom was dramatically underscored this past week by Turkey’s role in attacks against Kessab, Syria—the last and only vestige of a pre-Genocide era indigenous Armenian town within the territory of the former Ottoman Empire. The timely adoption of this measure will send a strong signal to Ankara that it must stop its anti-Christian conduct and start coming to terms with its moral, material, and legal obligations to Armenians, Syriacs, Cypriots, Pontians, and other victims of Turkey’s still unpunished genocidal crimes.”

In a statement issued upon introduction, Chairman Royce outlined the need for passage of H.R.4347. “This legislation holds Turkey accountable for its international obligations to protect and promote human rights, and it calls attention to Turkish leaders’ broken promises to return church properties to their rightful owners. Over decades, Christian church properties, particularly those belonging to the Armenian, Syriac, and Greek Orthodox communities have been either violently overtaken or illegally confiscated by Turkish authorities under various excuses. These churches under Turkish control have been looted, converted to mosques, storehouses, casinos, vandalized and often irreparably damaged,” stated Chairman Royce. “Vulnerable religious minorities deserve more than just piecemeal returns of their stolen religious properties. It is important that the United States continue to encourage Turkish leaders to uphold their commitments and return all remaining properties without further delay. This bill will make promoting religious freedom and tolerance in Turkey a U.S. diplomatic priority.”

Ranking Democrat Engel concurred, noting, “The Republic of Turkey, and indeed all nations, have a responsibility to protect, restore, and return religious properties which have been unlawfully seized from their communities and rightful owners by state authorities. Armenian, Syriac, and Greek Orthodox communities in Turkey have for many years been seeking the return of their confiscated properties. The claims of these communities must be respected and addressed in a comprehensive and timely manner. This legislation calls on the Republic of Turkey to meet its international obligations, and urges the United States to prioritize the return of unlawfully seized religious properties in order to begin to resolve the legitimate claims of these communities.”

The introduction of the resolution was spotlighted in “The Hill” Newspaper’s “Floor Action” blog, closely monitored by elected officials and Capitol Hill staff.

H.R. 4347 builds on a measure (H.Res.306), spearheaded by Chairman Royce and then House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Democrat Howard Berman (D-Calif.), which was overwhelmingly adopted by the House of Representatives on December 13, 2011. That resolution called upon the government of Turkey to honor its international obligations to return confiscated Christian church properties and to fully respect the rights of Christians to practice their faiths in freedom.

H.R.4347 specifically requires the Secretary of State to “submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the status and return of stolen, confiscated, or otherwise unreturned Christian churches, places of worship, and other properties in or from the Republic of Turkey and in the areas of northern Cyprus occupied by the Turkish military that shall contain the following:

(1) A comprehensive listing of all the Christian churches, places of worship, and other properties, such as monasteries, schools, hospitals, monuments, relics, holy sites, and other religious properties, including movable properties, such as artwork, manuscripts, vestments, vessels, and other artifacts, in or from Turkey and in the territories of the Republic of Cyprus under military occupation by Turkey that are claimed as stolen, confiscated, or otherwise wrongfully removed from the ownership of their rightful Christian church owners.

(2) Description of all engagement over the previous year on this issue by officials of the Department of State with representatives of the Republic of Turkey regarding the return to their rightful owners of all Christian churches, places of worship, and other properties, such as monasteries, schools, hospitals, monuments, relics, holy sites, and other religious properties, including movable properties, such as artwork, manuscripts, vestments, vessels, and other artifacts, both those located within Turkey’s borders and those under control of Turkish military forces in the occupied northern areas of Cyprus.”

The resolution goes on to urge that a summary of the report be included in the annual U.S. State Department Human Rights Report and International Religious Freedom Report.

The full text of H.R.4347 is provided below.

***

H.R. 4347 – Turkey Christian Churches Accountability Act

To require the Secretary of State to provide an annual report to Congress regarding United States Government efforts to survey and secure the return, protection, and restoration of stolen, confiscated, or otherwise unreturned Christian properties in the Republic of Turkey and in those areas currently occupied by the Turkish military in northern Cyprus.

Section 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the “Turkey Christian Churches Accountability Act”.

Sec. 2. Findings.

Congress finds the following:

(1) United States diplomatic leadership contributes meaningfully and materially to the protection internationally of religious minorities and their faith-based practices and places of worship.

(2) The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 states that “It shall be the policy of the United States to condemn violations of religious freedom, and to promote, and to assist other governments in the promotion of, the fundamental right to freedom of religion.”

(3) The House of Representatives, when it adopted House Resolution 306 on December 13, 2011, called on the Secretary of State, in all official contacts with Turkish leaders, to urge Turkey to “allow the rightful church and lay owners of Christian church properties, without hindrance or restriction, to organize and administer prayer services, religious education, clerical training, appointments, and succession”, and to “return to their rightful owners all Christian churches and other places of worship, monasteries, schools, hospitals, monuments, relics, holy sites, and other religious properties, including movable properties, such as artwork, manuscripts, vestments, vessels, and other artifacts”.

(4) On September 28, 2010, the House of Representatives adopted House Resolution 1631, calling for the protection of religious sites and artifacts, as well as for general respect for religious freedom in Turkish-occupied areas of northern Cyprus.

(5) Christian churches and communities in the Republic of Turkey and in the occupied areas of Cyprus continue to be prevented from fully practicing their faith and face serious obstacles to reestablishing full legal, administrative, and operational control over stolen, expropriated, confiscated, or otherwise unreturned churches and other religious properties and sites.

(6) In many cases the rightful Christian church authorities, including relevant Holy Sees located outside Turkey and Turkish-occupied territories, are obstructed from safeguarding, repairing, or otherwise caring for their holy sites upon their ancient homelands, because the properties have been destroyed, expropriated, converted into mosques, storage facilities, or museums, or subjected to deliberate neglect.

(7) While the Turkish Government has made efforts in recent years to address these issues and to return some church properties, much more must be done to rectify the situation of Christian communities in these areas, as a vast majority of Christian holy sites continue to be held by the Turkish Government or by third parties.

(8) On April 24, 2013, Catholicos Karekin II and Catholicos Aram I, spiritual leaders of the millions of Christian Armenian faithful in Armenia and the Diaspora, noted that Turkey continued to unjustly “[retain] confiscated church estates and properties, and religious and cultural treasures of the Armenian people”, and called on Turkey “[t]o immediately return the Armenian churches, monasteries, church properties, and spiritual and cultural treasures, to the Armenian people as their rightful owner”.

(9) The boundaries of Turkey encompass significant historic Christian lands, including the biblical lands of Armenia (present-day Anatolia), home to many of early Christianity’s pivotal events and holy sites, such as Mount Ararat, the location cited in the Bible as the landing place of Noah’s Ark.

(10) These ancient territories were for thousands of years home to a large, indigenous Christian population, but, because of years of repressive Turkish Government policies, historic atrocities, and brutal persecution, today Christians constitute less than one percent of Turkey’s population.

(11) As a result of the Turkish Government’s invasion of the northern area of the Republic of Cyprus on July 20, 1974, and the Turkish military’s continued illegal and discriminatory occupation of portions of this sovereign state, the future and very existence of Greek Cypriot, Maronite, and Armenian communities are now in grave jeopardy.

(12) Under the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus, freedom of worship has been severely restricted, access to religious sites blocked, religious sites systematically destroyed, and a large number of religious and archaeological objects illegally confiscated or stolen.

(13) The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, in its 2012 annual report, criticized “the Turkish government’s systematic and egregious limitations on the freedom of religion”, and warned that “[l]ongstanding policies continue to threaten the survivability and viability of minority religious communities in Turkey”.

(14) Christian minorities in Turkey continue to face discrimination, prohibitions on the training and succession of clergy, and violent attacks, which have at times resulted in lenient sentencing, including the reduced sentence for the murderer of the Catholic Church’s head bishop in Turkey, Luigi Padovese, in June 2010, or delayed justice, including the unresolved torture and murder, in April 2007, of three employees of a Protestant Bible publishing house in Malatya, Turkey.

(15) The Government of Turkey, in contravention of its international legal obligations, refuses to recognize the 2,000-year-old Sacred See of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s international status, has confiscated the large majority of the assets and properties of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Greek cultural and educational foundations, maintains that candidates for the position of Ecumenical Patriarch must be Turkish citizens, and continues to refuse to reopen the Theological School at Halki, thus impeding training and succession for the Greek Orthodox clergy in Turkey.

(16) The Government of Turkey, in contravention of its international legal obligations, continues to place substantial restrictions and other limitations upon the Armenian Patriarchate’s right to train and educate clergy and select and install successors without government interference.

(17) Religious freedom is an essential cornerstone of democracy that promotes respect for individual liberty, which contributes to greater stability, and is therefore a priority value for the United States to promote in its engagement with other countries.

Sec. 3. Report Requirement.

(a) IN GENERAL. – Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter until 2021, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the status and return of stolen, confiscated, or otherwise unreturned Christian churches, places of worship, and other properties in or from the Republic of Turkey and in the areas of northern Cyprus occupied by the Turkish military that shall contain the following:

(1) A comprehensive listing of all the Christian churches, places of worship, and other properties, such as monasteries, schools, hospitals, monuments, relics, holy sites, and other religious properties, including movable properties, such as artwork, manuscripts, vestments, vessels, and other artifacts, in or from Turkey and in the territories of the Republic of Cyprus under military occupation by Turkey that are claimed as stolen, confiscated, or otherwise wrongfully removed from the ownership of their rightful Christian church owners.

(2) Description of all engagement over the previous year on this issue by officials of the Department of State with representatives of the Republic of Turkey regarding the return to their rightful owners of all Christian churches, places of worship, and other properties, such as monasteries, schools, hospitals, monuments, relics, holy sites, and other religious properties, including movable properties, such as artwork, manuscripts, vestments, vessels, and other artifacts, both those located within Turkey’s borders and those under control of Turkish military forces in the occupied northern areas of Cyprus.

(b) INCLUSION IN ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES AND INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. – The information required under subsection (a) shall be summarized in the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and International Religious Freedom Reports.

Two weeks ago—on the last day of the three-month deadline—the Swiss government decided to file an appeal with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on the Perincek vs. Switzerland lawsuit.

Even though the text of the Swiss appeal has been kept under seal pending ECHR’s consideration, I was able to obtain a copy in French. This is the first time that the content of the Swiss appeal appears in the media.

The ECHR ruled on Dec. 17, 2013, that Swiss courts had violated the rights of Dogu Perincek, a minor Turkish party leader, who had traveled to Switzerland in 2005 with the explicit purpose of denying the Armenian Genocide. He had dared the Swiss authorities to arrest him for calling the Genocide “an international lie.”

Following his conviction for violating a Swiss law on racial discrimination, denial of genocide, and other crimes against humanity, Perincek appealed his sentence all the way to the Federal Tribunal, the highest court in Switzerland, which confirmed his guilt. He then applied to the European Court of Human Rights, accusing Switzerland of violating many of his rights, including that of free speech. Surprisingly, five of the seven ECHR judges exonerated Perincek, finding that Switzerland violated certain provisions of the European Convention.

If left unchallenged, ECHR’s ruling would have been a major setback for recognition of the Armenian Genocide, particularly before the worldwide commemoration of the Centennial of the Genocide to be held on April 24, 2015. Even more importantly, by exceeding their mandate on the alleged infringements of Perincek’s rights, the majority of the ECHR judges raised questions about the validity of the Armenian Genocide. They also drew unwarranted and superfluous distinctions between the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust, ruling that punishing the deniers of the former is illegal, while convicting those denying the latter is proper.

Given the detrimental consequences of this unjustified ruling on the Armenian Cause, the government of Armenia, Armenian communities worldwide, and Swiss-Armenians in particular, lobbied Switzerland to make sure that it appeals ECHR’s decision in the Perincek case. In reality, the Swiss authorities should not have needed any prodding from Armenians, since they had an obligation to defend the judgments of their own courts, including the Federal Tribunal, and the integrity of their country’s legal system!

The six-page Swiss appeal, filed on March 17, 2014, asserted that ECHR’s ruling raised “serious questions regarding the interpretation and application” of the European Convention on Human Rights for the following three reasons:

—The ruling involves an issue—the Armenian Genocide—that has never been considered by ECHR. This case raises two fundamental juridical questions that the Court has not dealt with: The juridical qualification of the Genocide and the scope of freedom of expression, when a state party to the Convention, in the framework of fighting racism, criminalizes the denial of genocide.

—The ruling reduces in an undue manner “the margin of appreciation” available to Switzerland under the jurisprudence of ECHR. Perincek had repeatedly stated that he would never change his mind on the Armenian Genocide. His denialist position is “particularly offensive.” The Court’s contention that such a person would bring any value to “the debate and historical research” on this issue “is a departure from ECHR’s established and balanced jurisprudence.”

—The ruling creates “artificial distinctions.” Perincek does not simply contest the use of the term genocide, but qualifies the Armenian mass killings as an “international lie.” Furthermore, even though there has not been an international verdict in the case of the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish Court’s 1919 verdict against the masterminds of the Armenian Genocide “constituted an element of reliable evidence, acknowledging the facts or unfavorable conduct” relative to the World Court’s jurisprudence. Furthermore, even “the Nuremberg Tribunal did not mention the term genocide and did not convict the Nazi perpetrators for committing genocide, but crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”

The Swiss appeal has provided compelling arguments and convincing evidence that five of the seven ECHR judges made serious judgmental and factual errors in delivering a ruling in favor of Perincek and against Switzerland.

A panel of five new ECHR judges will now decide whether to refer Switzerland’s appeal to the 17-judge Grand Chamber for a final determination.

The Armenian Weekly March 2014 Magazine:
Armenia’s Foreign Policy in Focus

In an interview with news.am in June 2012¹, Armenia’s deputy foreign minister, Shavarsh Kocharyan, defined the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and ensured that regional security was Armenia’s top foreign policy priority for the coming five years. The creation of favorable external conditions for economic development, and work toward the prevention and condemnation of crimes against humanity, such as genocide, followed in the list. Focusing on the latter, Kocharyan recalled the upcoming “100^th anniversary of the tragedy the Armenian people survived,” and pointed out the importance of prevention efforts not only for Armenia and the diaspora but for the entire world—because, he said, “unpunished crimes against humanity and their denial create fertile ground for recurrence of similar events.” As for Armenia’s international relations, Kocharyan mentioned its strategic partnership with Russia, ties with U.S. and the European Union (EU), as well as with neighbors such as Georgia and Iran. China, India, Japan, the Arab world, Africa, and Latin America would be a “focal point of Armenia’s foreign policy priorities,” he said. Concerning international organizations, the deputy foreign minister cited the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and its relations with Russia as factors that ensure Armenia’s military and political security, as well as cooperation with NATO and European powers.

Following the extradition of Ramil Safarov, Armenians took to the streets of Yerevan, burning pictures of the axe-murderer and chucking tomatoes at the Hungarian Embassy. (Twitter photo by @Vozni)

This busy agenda as outlined by Kocharyan was apparently not convincing for the opposition. “We don’t have a foreign policy doctrine as a state; we just act on an ad-hoc basis each time we see something is wrong,” said Aram Sargsyan, head of the Armenian Democratic Party, in a briefing with journalists on Sept. 14, 2012.² This is the main criticism against Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian and his handling of Armenia’s diplomacy since he assumed the job in April 2008, after the election of President Serge Sarkisian, especially in the aftermath of the extradition of Ramil Safarov (the Azeri official who assassinated his Armenian counterpart during a NATO training program) from Hungary to Azerbaijan, where he was immediately released and honored as a national hero. Whether Armenian diplomacy could have prevented the extradition of Safarov is, of course, debatable. However, there is enough ground to maintain that early warning was emitted, no less than in the form of a letter that the Armenian community in Hungary sent to the Ministry of Diaspora, yet Armenian diplomacy failed to preempt, or react properly.

A single episode, no matter how critical, cannot, of course, be an argument to judge 20 years of foreign policy, as Aram Sargsyan’s statement, among others, suggests. Moreover, the Safarov affair was a circumstantial event, which a priori does not tell much about the rationale of Armenian diplomacy. Yet, when one year later, on Sept. 3, 2013, President Sarkisian surprised everyone with his decision not to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union, and instead join the Customs Union with the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, Armenian diplomacy suffered a severe blow in its credibility. Just days before, the deputy foreign minister had given public assurances that Armenia would stand firm in its engagement with the EU’s proposal and integrate the Eastern Partnership program. Foreign Ministry officials had been negotiating the agreement with their European counterparts since 2010, right after Brussels launched the program.

The disappointment in Armenia was immediate and was widely reflected in the social media. It was not only about “an economic choice,” as Armenian Weekly columnist Houry Mayissian put it.

“The agreement with the EU would have required that Armenia gradually adopt EU regulations and standards. Implemented correctly, these regulations would have contributed to Armenia’s

democratization.”³ 

Of course, no one could question the explanation given by Armenian officials regarding the president’s move: Sarkisian, to quote De Waal, could not have possibly refused Putin’s “offer.”⁴ Economic

Protesters are blocked off by heavy police presence, following President Serge Sarkisian’s Sept. 3 announcement. (Photo: Samson Martirosyan/The Armenian Weekly)

and energy dependence and military reliance on Russia were unquestionably the reasons. An expert on EU-Armenia relations, Syuzanna Vasilyan, observes that “[t]hrough its promulgated foreign policy of ‘complementarity,’ Armenia has benefited not only by being able to direct its gaze equally towards both the EU and its member-states and Russia and to take advantage of the technical and financial assistance offered by the former and military guarantees ensured by the latter, but it has also managed not to be the ‘apple of contention’ between the United States and Iran.”⁵ Despite this carefully balanced foreign policy, Armenia’s main concerns—the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, the threat posed by Azerbaijan and Turkey’s ongoing blockade—have not been addressed. Vasilyan highlights Armenia’s disappointment from the Europeans: “Previously hopeful of the EU as capable of delivering on these challenges by ‘disciplining’ Azerbaijan to halt military escalation and Turkey to open the border with Armenia, the country seems to have become discouraged given the [EU’s] inability/non-disposition to meddle with such a major security provider as Turkey and energy provider as Azerbaijan.”⁶ However, she does not discount Russian pressure, which she characterizes as no less than “intolerance” for Armenia’s “complementarity” policy. As a result, Vasilyan concludes, Armenia has moved from a foreign policy of “complementarity” to “supplementarity.”

The Sept. 3, 2013 decision, hence, seems to have indicated a turning point in Armenia’s foreign policy. With the prospect of a Eurasian Union in 2015 and Armenia’s inclusion in it, complementarity would not make much sense. Assuming that the Eurasian project would/could indeed become a reality, it would not be a Soviet Union resurrected, rather the attempt to institutionalize the Russian zone of influence on its “near abroad,” as coined early in 1992 by then-Prime Minister Andrei Kozyrev, a Westerner so to speak. Complementarity, as coined and explained by Vartan Oskanyan, Robert Kocharyan’s foreign minister from 1998 to 2008, is a proactive diplomacy meant to be more than a balancing act or neutrality. The idea, he wrote in his memoirs, was that Armenia could be a meeting point, where the interests of competing powers could find some sort of common ground. “Moreover, pursuing our own national interests, we had to be able to ensure that we would not exploit the opposing interests of third parties and play one against the other.”⁷ This proactive diplomacy will not end, but it has clearly been seriously jeopardized; and the Eurasian prospect of the Russian zone of influence in its near abroad has put serious limitations on its implementation beyond its use in public declarations, discourses, or wishful thinking…

The complementarity vision is not exempt of criticism. It failed, for instance, to consider the importance of the so-called Global South, in general, and South America, in particular, until Azerbaijan in 2010 launched an aggressive diplomacy and very quickly took advantage of Yerevan’s passivity. Yet, there is little doubt that the concept enjoys popularity and some broad consensus among the Armenian political elite. It is clear now that an assertive Moscow has little sympathy for it. It is also clear that structural factors, namely security, energy, and economy, and not political ones explain the impossibility for the Sarkisian Administration to convince the Kremlin that within the logic of complementarity, Armenia’s Association Agreement with the EU would not have nullified its strategic partnership with Russia. Likewise, at least for now, Yerevan also failed to convince Brussels that while Armenia could be in a Customs Union with the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, within the complementarity logic it could have also joined the Eastern Partnership program. Incidentally, Putin’s either/or logic for the Eurasian Union did not only apply to Armenia; he also applied it with Ukraine, although the now-removed Viktor Yanukovich did not need any conceptual sophistication when deciding in favor of the Russian 15 billion credit line and subsidized gas prices, instead of complications with “European values.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin visits the 102nd Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia, on Dec. 2, 2013. (Photo: Kremlin.ru)

Against Russian assertiveness, then, Armenia apparently had no choice; it was first and foremost a national security matter in terms of military reliance, as well as for economic and energetic dependence. However, as Mayissian correctly observed, “While partly the result of the hostility we have faced from Azerbaijan and Turkey, it is also in large part a consequence of the inability of successive Armenian governments to negotiate a position of mutual benefit in this strategic alliance. In a region where other countries are either outright hostile to Russia or have more subtly yet decisively expressed their inclinations towards Europe, Armenia remains one of Russia’s few allies. In the last two decades, Armenian leaders—both in government and in opposition—have failed to communicate to Russia that this ongoing alliance comes at a cost; and that cost is not the mere survival of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabagh, but rather their growth and prosperity.”⁸

This leads us to ask about the root causes of the failure of Armenian diplomacy in consolidating the complementarity action line, if by that concept we mean a strategic orientation in the country’s foreign policy. For, as much as the structural factors put serious limitations on “small states” like Armenia,⁹ the making of foreign policy is also influenced by domestic factors. Thus, as the field of foreign policy analysis developed since the late 1950’s, the focus has mostly been on the decision-making process.¹⁰ Who makes the decisions, in what conditions, and from which perspective? These questions open fields of inquiry that help to shed some light on explications that seem too deterministic or too abstract, such as the widely used “national interests.” So far, Armenia’s foreign policy has not been studied from this analytical perspective; nor do we have serious research on the institutionalization of foreign policy in terms of the structuring of the ministry, the organization of diplomatic careers, the formation of future diplomats, the evaluation of their performance and, last but not least, the resources dedicated to a field Oskanyan defined as “the defensive and offensive frontline” of a small country like Armenia—vital “not only to ensure security and territorial integrity, to seek a resolution of the conflicts, but also to attract investments, secure exportation, implement big project and, in general, for economic development.”¹¹

The farewell to complementarity that Armenia’s East-turn has apparently imposed on Yerevan’s foreign policy does not mean forgetting about its virtues. It suggests, however, that a serious analysis is needed to reconsider the domestic-structural foundations of Armenian diplomacy in terms of decision-making and resource allocation, as well as its strategic orientation. Finally, foreign policy, as any public policy, needs a broad national consensus to rally support for any decision affecting Armenia and Armenians in general. In other words, when addressing the analysis of Armenia’s foreign policy from a normative perspective in terms of “what to do?” and aiming for a broad national consensus-building objective, neither the democratic imperative nor the engagement of the diaspora should be overlooked.

Notes

1 “Armenian MFA on Foreign Policy Priorities Envisaged in Government Program: Interview.” See http://news.am/eng/news/110512.html

2 “Armenia does not have a foreign policy doctrine: Sargsyan.” See http://www.1in.am/eng/armenia_politics_2218.html. Last access: September 15, 2012.

3 Houry Mayissian, “Democracy, Sovereignty and Armenia’s Eurasian Path,” The Armenian Weekly, Sept. 12, 2013. See http://www.armenianweekly.com/2013/09/12/democracy-sovereignty-and-armenias-eurasian-path. Last access: Sept. 12, 2013.

4 Thomas de Waal, “An Offer Sargsyan Could Not Refuse,” Eurasia Outlook, Carnegie Moscow Center, Sept. 4, 2013. See http://carnegie.ru/eurasianoutlook. Last access: Sept. 4, 2013.

5 Syuzanna Vasilyan, “Armenia from a Foreign Policy of ‘Complementarity’ to ‘Supplementarity’? A Sandwich Story!” International Affairs Forum. See http://www.ia-forum.org/Content/ViewInternalDocument.cfm?ContentID=8084. Last access: March 6, 2014.

6 Idem.

7 Vartan Oskanian, Through the Road of Independence. The Big Challenges of the Small Country. From the Minister’s Diary, Yerevan, Armenia: Civilitas Fund, 2013, p. 82. Original in Armenian; unofficial translation by author. The same procedure will apply to any quote from any non-English texts.

8 Mayisian, Op. Cit.

9 See Asbed Kotchikian, The Dialectics of Small States: Policy Making in Armenia and Georgia, VDM Verlag, 2008.

10 Valerie M. Hudson, “The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis,” in Foreign Policy. Theories/Actors/Cases, Second Edition, Eds. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 13-34.

11 Oskanyan, Op. Cit., p. 12.

WASHINGTON, DC – Most United Nations Security Council members have “raised the issue” of the recent takeover of the historically Armenian town of Kessab, Syria, and urged the world body “to do more to meet the needs of these people,” U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power told Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) and members of a key House Appropriations panel earlier today during a Congressional hearing, reported the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA).

Click here to view the embedded video.

“We join with Armenians across California and around America in thanking Congressman Schiff for raising the plight of the Armenians driven out of Kessab with Ambassador Power,” said ANCA Executive Director Aram Hamparian.  “We appreciate Ambassador Power’s statement that Kessab is ‘an issue of huge concern,’ and value her explanation to Congress about the UN Security Council’s efforts to help the Armenian civilians driven from their homes by extremist militants. We will continue to work, in partnership with our friends in Congress, to encourage our government to speak directly to the cause of Kessab’s suffering – namely the clear complicity of Turkey in the al-Qaeda linked attack that drove more than 2,000 Armenians from their ancestral homes.”

The ANCA has called on the Senate and House Intelligence committees to investigate Turkey’s role in the recent attacks against the Kessab civilian population.  A new action alert has been posted at: http://www.anca.org/savekessab and has received broad support following social media posts by citizens and celebrities alike.

During a question and answer session at the House Appropriations Committee State-Foreign Operations Subcommittee hearing with Ambassador Power earlier today, Rep. Schiff asked “About a week ago, the town of Kessab, which is predominantly Armenian Christian, was attacked by Al-Qaeda-linked fighters who had crossed over from Turkey and the town was emptied in a bloody assault.  Many of the residents are descendants of the Armenian Genocide and there is particular poignancy in them being targeted in this manner.” Rep. Schiff went on to ask what efforts the United Nations and its agencies are making to address the crisis.

Ambassador Power, noting that the recent attacks on Kessab are a “huge concern,” went on to note that: “Most of the [UN Security] Council members raised the issue of Kessab, calling on the UN to do more, to try to meet the needs of these people. [...] I would note that, unfortunately, the extremist group that appears to have taken hold of that town is not one that the United States and the United Nations overall has a great deal of leverage over.  And so, our emphasis now, is on supporting the moderate opposition in Syria that is taking on those extremist groups and making sure that the UN has the funding it needs, and the resources of all kinds that it needs to accommodate [...] in this case, the Syrian Armenian community, as you said, an internally displaced population flow. So, it’s resources, it’s strengthening the moderate opposition which is taking on ISIL – the very group that appears to have taken over that town – making sure that none of the neighbors are giving support to terrorist groups or extremist groups which would aid their efforts in seizures like that, and going on a funding drive internationally because only a very small percentage of the UN funding appeal for Syria generally has been filled at this point.”

The video excerpt from the Schiff-Power exchange dealing with the Kessab crisis is available at: http://youtu.be/UQLLEyUiyVY

Located in the northwestern corner of Syria, near the border with Turkey, Kessab had, until very recently, evaded major battles in the Syrian conflict. The local Armenian population had increased in recently years with the city serving as safe-haven for those fleeing from the war-torn cities of Yacubiye, Rakka and Aleppo.  On the morning of March 21st, extremist foreign fighters launched a vicious attack, from Turkey, on Kessab civilians, forcing over 2000 to flee to neighboring Latakia and Bassit.  An international social media campaign – #SaveKessab – has garnered broad media attention to the tragedy with over 100,000 tweeting about the crisis and tens of thousands calling for immediate U.S. and U.N. action.

In a statement issued last week, the U.S. State Department noted that they are “deeply troubled by recent fighting and violence that is endangering the Armenian community in Kasab, Syria and has forced many to flee. There are far too many innocent civilians suffering as a result of the war. All civilians, as well as their places of worship, must be protected.”  The statement went on to note that “We have long had concerns about the threat posed by violent extremists and this latest threat to the Armenian community in Syria only underscores this further.”

Representatives Adam Schiff (D-CA), Brad Sherman (D-CA), Jim Costa (D-CA), James McGovern (D-MA) and Jackie Speier (D-CA) have condemned the attacks and urged the State Department to investigate Turkey’s involvement.  In a joint letter to President Obama issued earlier today, Congressional Armenian Caucus co-Chairs Frank Pallone (D-NJ) and Michael Grimm (R-NY) and Armenian Genocide Resolution (H.Res.227) lead authors David Valadao (R-CA) and Adam Schiff, commented on the Kessab attacks, noting ” When coupled with a mass exodus of the Armenian community, these events are far too reminiscent of the early days of the Armenian Genocide, which took place nearly 100 years ago in Ottoman Turkey under the cover of World War I.”  The letter goes on to note,” With the Christian Armenian community being uprooted from its homeland, yet again, we strongly urge you to take all necessary measures without delay to safeguard the Christian Armenian community of Kessab.  We also believe that now is the time to redouble America’s efforts to ensure that all minority communities at risk in the Middle East are afforded greater protection.”

The post Amb. Power: Most UN Security Council Members Concerned About Kessab appeared first on Armenian Weekly.

The Armenian Weekly March 2014 Magazine:
Armenia’s Foreign Policy in Focus

According to the Karabagh Ministry of Defense, Junior Sergeant Armen L. Hovhannisyan was killed on Jan. 20, 2014 repelling an Azeri force engaged in a probing action against Karabagh defensive positions along the Line of Contact (LoC). In recognition of his exemplary action in protecting his country, President Bako Sahakian awarded Sgt. Hovhannisyan Karabagh’s Medal of Courage. He was buried with full military honors in the Yerablur Military Pantheon in Yerevan, Armenia.

Junior sergeant Armen L. Hovhannisyan

How many more young men in uniform are to be killed by the Azeri military before action takes the place of rhetoric? A measured response that sends an unambiguous message not only to the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, but to the provocateur Azerbaijan that these continuing border aggressions are counterproductive to a negotiated settlement.

Fearful of losing more land to the Karabagh Armenians, Azerbaijan signed the ceasefire that took effect in 1994. Evidently the Azeri leadership is still suffering the anguish of its embarrassing defeat to the Armenians. These constant violations along the LoC; the killing of Armenian soldiers by sniper fire; and the harassment by gunfire of Armenian civilians who live and work their fields close to the border are meant to assuage the anguish that still lingers. More to the point, however, is the need by President Aliyev to “save face”; his people surely recognize the disconnect between the rhetoric of their fearless leader and his inability to regain Artsakh (Karabagh).

The tepid responses by the co-chairs have served to encourage rather than deter such actions. On Jan. 15, 2014, during a planned monitoring of the positions along the LoC, Azerbaijan—with impunity—prevented the OSCE mission from visiting the front lines in the occupied area of the Martuni district facing the Karabagh settlement of Kuropatkin. This is a strategic sector on the LoC located just north of Martuni, the administrative capital. These front-line positions are the closest Azeri positions to Stepanakert, Artsakh’s capital. This fact may have been sufficient reason for the Azeris to deny access to the OSCE monitors. Or possibly that their generalissimo, Ilham Aliyev, is in complete control of the situation.

The latest provocation on the border that resulted in the killing of Sgt. Hovhannisyan occurred within days of a foreign ministers’ meeting in Paris between Edward Nalbandian and Elmar Mammadyrov. It would have been appropriate (and not an extreme response) for President Sarkisian to have used this unfortunate incident to call off the meeting, as well as to question the value of any meeting with Aliyev in the near future.

This raises the question that seems to elude an answer: How can the Minsk Group co-chairs expect a peaceful resolution of Artsakh’s status given the constant flow of inflammatory rhetoric by Aliyev; the massive military build-up that he continually threatens to use; and the flagrant violations of the ceasefire agreement that targets both military personnel and innocent civilians in the border regions of both Artsakh and Armenia? When the Minsk Group co-chairs do respond to Azerbaijan’s transgressions, their mealy-mouthed approach is to lecture both the provocateur Azerbaijan and the victims, Artsakh and Armenia.

How can the co-chairs, who were to meet with Nalbandian in Yerevan several weeks after this latest provocation, entertain the notion that Artsakh’s independence can be negotiated away? I say “negotiated away” because there is no principle guiding the negotiations (that has been divulged) that addresses Artsakh’s future status as a sovereign entity. Here was an opportunity, if a protest demonstration was to be held in Yerevan, to stress Artsakh’s right to independence—the subtext being that Artsakh is prepared to withstand any action by Azerbaijan that compromises its independence. That should also be the subtext of any understanding that comes out of any meetings with the co-chairs. This may be viewed as an extremely strong position to take, but Armenia is at a showdown moment in its history. Has our nation risen from its near obliteration from the genocide to now, meek and mute, wait while other nations decide its future? Our forebears would weep at our timidity and lack of resolve. Russia may control (for the present) our government in Armenia, but surely Russia does not control our determination and spirit. This is precisely what has kept us a vibrant and recognizable nation for millennia.

Why we skirt around this issue of ultimate independence for Artsakh is baffling. We should not lose sight of the fact that the negotiation process does not include any option for recognizing Artsakh’s sovereignty other than reference to a vote sometime in the future to determine Karabagh’s—not Artsakh’s—status after a treaty has been signed.

Arriving at that treaty, however, is predicated on the withdrawal of our military forces from the liberated territories; the right of return of displaced Azeris to Artsakh; the guarantee of a secure land route (possibly two) between Armenia and Karabagh (which we already have); and the occupation of the liberated territories and Karabagh by an international peacekeeping force. At that point, the military advantage would have shifted decisively to Azerbaijan.

Once our forces have withdrawn from the liberated territories, they will be lost to us forever. It is also likely that Shahumian will not be returned to Karabagh; return of the Azeri-occupied border regions of Martakert and Martuni is questionable. Unfortunately, these are needless worries. By the time the vote to determine Karabagh’s—not Artsakh’s—status is actually held, Azeris will form a majority of the population. And independence will never be supported by the majority Azeri voters. The best-case scenario for Armenians is that Karabagh may gain limited local autonomy as a region within Azerbaijan, which Baku will suspend whenever it determines the time is right.

A scene from Junior Sergeant Armen Hovhannisyan’s funeral.

Within a generation following this meaningless vote, Karabagh will be overrun by more Azeris under what we should expect will be a government-sponsored resettlement program that aims to reduce the Armenian population to an impotent minority on its own lands. Given this foreseeable development, we will be forced to witness Karabagh become another Nakhitchevan. One more historic Armenian land purged of Armenians. Is this why some 7,000 brave azatamartiks sacrificed their lives, with countless others suffering debilitating wounds?

If we cannot (at least, for the present) overcome the political realities that prevent the de jure recognition of Artsakh, then continuing to engage in a holding action—maintaining the status quo—is our only recourse. It has been 20 years since the 1994 ceasefire. However, the future years must witness a meaningful expansion and diversification of Artsakh’s economy and an accelerated increase in its population that will yield an independent Artsakh as a fait accompli. Embracing these objectives is an absolute necessity. Unfortunately there can never be a guarantee, but short of the de jure recognition that still remains a possibility or defeating Azerbaijan a second time, are there other options available?

It is unfortunate that we have never sought to provide a properly documented legal basis to support the right of the Karabagh Armenians to declare their independence based on the Soviet Constitution in force at the time; or on the internationally accepted principle of self-determination; or on the principle of remedial secession. If that right had been established, the negotiations would be dealing with indemnification, boundary adjustments, etc., rather than the nebulous future status of Artsakh.

Secondly, the principle of territorial integrity that is continually referred to by Azerbaijan with the implication that this is an Armenian irredenta issue is a red herring. We have unwittingly allowed Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations which states that “All Members shall refrain…from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity…of any State…” to muddy the waters. Artsakh is not a sovereign State, therefore this principle cannot apply. Neither should it apply to Armenia. Armenia is a sovereign State, but Armenia neither threatened nor used force against the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Its presence in Artsakh was based on the principle of humanitarian intervention. Its intervention prevented the indiscriminate killing, perhaps another genocide of the Armenian population in Artsakh under cover of a war begun by Azerbaijan. Does this sound familiar? Its continued presence and support serves as a deterrent against an Azeri military force that poses a direct and immediate threat to the Artsakh Armenians as numerous violations along the LoC amply attest. Yet, Armenia has not attempted to justify its role in Artsakh based on the principle of humanitarian intervention.

The killing of Sgt. Hovannisian is not some isolated event without historic meaning. He gave his life in the continuing struggle that we are engaged in with those who still seek to destroy us as a nation. Today there is no cause with greater meaning than the de jure recognition of Artsakh’s independence. The credibility of Hai Tahd and the future of Armenia are intimately related to the land that Junior Sergeant Hovannisian was killed protecting.

Stephen Kurkjian, three-time Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative reporter (retired) for the Boston Globe and the son of a survivor of the Armenian Genocide, will present an overview of his ten years of research into a unique Genocide-era photograph in the illustrated lecture “Kiss My Children’s Eyes, Revisited: A Ten-Year Search for Answers to the Armenian Genocide Through One Remarkable Photograph” on Wednesday, April 23, 2014, at 7:30 p.m., at the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research (NAASR) Center , 395 Concord Ave., Belmont, Mass. The lecture will be held on in commemoration of the 99^th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide.

The photograph is virtually unique in showing a group of identified men rounded up by the authorities, many of whose fates—public executions, massacres, death marches—are known.

A group of Armenian men are photographed standing under Ottoman Turkish guard in front of a building in Gesaria (Kayseri) in 1915. The building is a prison and the men, most of whose names have come to be listed under the photograph, will soon be taken away and murdered, early victims of the genocide of the Armenians committed by the Ottoman Empire. Who were these men and how did they die?  What became of their families? Who took this photograph and how did it survive?

Stephen Kurkjian

The photograph is virtually unique in showing a group of identified men rounded up by the authorities, many of whose fates—public executions, massacres, death marches—are known. Yet until the past decade it had never been researched. Acclaimed investigative journalist and long-serving NAASR Board Member Stephen Kurkjian has attempted to decode the story told by this photograph and gone on an odyssey with unexpected revelations and continuing mysteries.

Using his skills as a reporter and the historical documentary resources available to him, Kurkjian has unraveled some—but not all—of the puzzles of the photograph, and, with the assistance of a number of researchers including renowned genocide scholar Dr. Vahakn N. Dadrian, traced how the Armenian Genocide came to Gesaria. Focusing on the microcosm offered by this single photograph, Kurkjian has found a unique window into the macrocosm of the destruction of the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire.

An article based on Kurkjian’s research will appear in the April 2014 special magazine issue of the Armenian Weekly and subsequently in the Journal of Armenian Studies.

Admission to the event is free (donations appreciated).  The NAASR Bookstore will open at 7:00 p.m.  The NAASR Center is located opposite the First Armenian Church and next to the U.S. Post Office. Ample parking is available around the building and in adjacent areas.  The lecture will begin promptly at 7:30 p.m. and interested parties are strongly encouraged to arrive early as space is limited and a large turnout is anticipated.

More information about the lecture is available by calling (617) 489-1610, faxing (617) 484-1759, e-mailing hq@naasr.org, or writing to NAASR, 395 Concord Ave., Belmont, MA 02478.

The Armenian Weekly March 2014 Magazine:
Armenia’s Foreign Policy in Focus

The U.S. was quick in acknowledging the independence of the Soviet breakaway countries, and was one of the first to acknowledge the Republic of Armenia on Dec. 25, 1991. Not long after that, on Jan. 7, 1992, the two countries established diplomatic relations. The U.S. Embassy in Yerevan was opened a year later, on Feb. 3, 1993. Armenia, as well as the other 14 countries that once formed an integral part of the Soviet Union, started to be referred to as the NIS (Newly Independent States). The U.S. immediately adopted a policy to assist these countries in humanitarian, political, and economic terms to ensure their survival.

Armenians gather as Lenin’s statue is toppled in Republic (once, Lenin) square.

For the U.S., it was vital to see Armenia step onto a path of sustainable development mostly because of the latter’s geographic position, coupled with the fact that it’s a mono-ethnic country with a majority Christian population, as well as some other geopolitical peculiarities. Armenia was seen as a country the U.S. could establish friendly relations with and use as a positive actor in the U.S.-Iran and U.S.-Russia relations, as well as in other broader Middle Eastern issues. Armenia was also an essential corridor through which the north was connected to the south, and the east to the west. Vast Caspian resources could be transferred over Armenia’s territory. Having a reliable partner with such a strategic geographic position could strengthen the U.S.’s presence in the South Caucasus.

For most of the NIS states, and particularly for Armenia, independence was much desired. However, Armenia was unprepared to adequately deal with it. This was mostly due to the fact that it inherited inefficient economic and political systems, and had an extremely complex process of dissolution, which gave rise to new challenges that were even harder to deal with. In Armenia’s case, independence was accompanied with the escalation of conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Not long before Armenia gained independence, a tragic earthquake had hit its northern part in 1988, taking the lives of more than 20,000 people and resulting in a humanitarian catastrophe. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani government was pushing for an economic blockade, and was soon joined by Turkey—proof of the brotherhood between these two countries. The situation was made even more difficult by the enormous flow of Armenian refugees from Baku, Sumgait, and other areas of Azerbaijan, where a campaign of ethnic cleansing was ongoing.

Taking into consideration this and other similarly challenging situations in the NIS, the U.S. Congress adopted the FREEDOM Support Act (Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act; FSA). The FSA aimed at helping NIS countries and was the main mechanism of humanitarian and other types of assistance, including economic, political technical, and democratic assistance. Armenia was included in this act and in the early and mid-1990’s received more assistance from the U.S. government than any other NIS country—a large fraction of the $41 billion in total aid. Amendment 907 of the FSA, which prohibited support to the Azerbaijani government because of the economic blockade on Armenia, was another form of support from the U.S. The establishment of the Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues in 1995 further strengthened the bilateral relations between Armenia and the U.S. This Caucus was the result of consistent work by Armenian Americans aiming to coordinate work on Armenian issues, promoting legislative initiatives in Congress, and strengthening Diaspora-Armenia relations. Armenia was also able to participate in numerous U.S.-supported programs aimed at strengthening civil society, disseminating democratic values, raising the qualifications of Armenian workers, scholars, and students, and improving the electoral and judicial systems. This was done through a provision of governmental grants to different NGOs, individuals, and institutions working in these fields.

Programs like Enterprise Development and Market Competitiveness (EDMC), Partners for Financial Stability (PFS), Tax Reform Project (TRP), and Entrepreneurship and Civic Activism for Young People were just a few of the projects implemented by USAID in Armenia starting in the early 1990’s. The opening of the American University of Armenia (AUA) contributed enormously to bilateral cooperation in the sphere of education and science. Numerous student and teacher exchange programs gave Armenians a chance to improve their professional qualifications in the U.S. and later contribute their knowledge in the state-building mission in Armenia.

Such fruitful U.S.-Armenian cooperation would have been impossible without friendly relations with high-ranking officials and working visits. Former Foreign Minister Vahan Papazian visited the U.S. in 1993, former President Levon Ter-Petrosian followed suit with an official working visit in 1994, and former Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan was in the U.S. in 1999. From the American side, Secretary of State James Baker visited Armenia in 1992 and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot came in 1999.

Despite the cooperation between these two countries, political developments in Armenia turned out to be quite negative for such cooperation. The presidential election of 1996, which was described by

Former President Levon Ter-Petrosian (Photo: Photolur)

most observers as non-transparent, was the main reason for this. A New York Times article reflected the situation more clearly: “Armenia has drifted towards dictatorship… Presidential elections this fall were found to be so deeply flawed that the United States, which provides more foreign aid to Armenia per person than to any country except Israel, declined to offer routine congratulations to the winner, Levon Ter-Petrosian. It has been a year of diminishing press freedom and rising human-rights violations. Most of all, it has been a year in which Ter-Petrosian, once revered as the man who brought democracy to Armenia, appears to have completed a journey from liberal intellectual to stony autocrat.”¹ The tragic event in 1999, when Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan, Speaker of Parliament Karen Demirchyan, and six other high-ranking officials were killed during a terrorist attack on parliament, was another negative factor that affected Armenia’s positive image in the eyes of the U.S. Armenia was no longer considered a stability spot in the South Caucasus when compared to Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Overall, the 1990’s can be described as a time when both sides were working actively to establish ties. These were indispensable for Armenia to develop its infrastructure, heal its economy, and build a civil society using financial, technical, and other types of American support. For the U.S., it was a time when aid to Armenia could bring positive effects to the entire region. Armenia was a main actor here, and any instability in the Nagorno-Karabagh region could shatter the fragile security of the South Caucasus. Moreover, because Armenia relied on Iran (its only stable border; Georgia plunged into ethno-political conflicts, and Azerbaijan and Turkey closed their borders) and Russia backed the CSTO to ensure its security, the U.S. didn’t have any direct leverage on Armenia, which meant friendly relations were vital for both sides. The Clinton Administration looked to establish new energy routes, through which Caspian resources could flow to the West. Unfortunately, Armenia was excluded from these regional projects because of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and the open policy of isolating Armenia actively pursued by Azerbaijan and Turkey. These routes also bypassed the territories of Iran and Russia.

September 11 had a huge impact on U.S. foreign policy, more or less defining the next eight years of U.S. policy abroad. The Bush Administration sought more stability and security, which was accompanied with its fight against terrorism. The South Caucasus rose in importance, as they were territories through which the U.S. could secure its air corridor. The close proximity of Iran to the region was another factor. The U.S. needed the South Caucasus mainly for its broader plans and policy regarding Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. Whereas military cooperation between Georgia and Azerbaijan deepened—the former had a pro-Western-oriented government and the latter had vast energy resources—Armenia remained marginalized and isolated from these developments. This is partly due to the fact that Armenia relied on Russia on security issues; there is still a Russian military base in Armenia’s second largest city of Gyumri. While programs for democratization and assistance continued, and the U.S. remained actively engaged in the peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan (in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group), aside from political rhetoric, relations between these two countries proceeded at a slow pace—for several reasons.

Turkey, as a key NATO member and a military partner of the U.S., granted the U.S. the exceptional right to use its territory and air space for troop deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. In this sense, it was vital to maintain close ties with Turkey. As it is widely known, Turkey and Armenia have no bilateral relations. While the Armenian lobby in the U.S. pushed for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide in Congress, the Bush Administration could not neglect its close military ties with Turkey, which led to the rejection of the Armenian Genocide bill. Bush himself said, “We all deeply regret the tragic suffering of the Armenian people that began in 1915. But this resolution is not the right response to these historic mass killings and its passage would do great harm to relations with a key ally in NATO, and to the war on terror.”²

The second reason is related to Azerbaijan’s role, specifically the importance of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and Azerbaijan’s air space, through which the U.S. launched operations in Afghanistan. Because relations with Azerbaijan were assessed higher, Bush waived Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act in the early 2000s, although the total cancellation of Section 907 did not succeed.

The third reason involves Georgia and its openly declared course towards NATO and the West. Bush’s two-day visit to Georgia is proof of this. Armenia had a smaller role, if any role at all.

With the election of President Barack Obama, U.S. foreign policy began to gradually change. The Iran nuclear issue, the “Arab Spring,” the global economic crisis, problems with North Korea, and other factors helped shape U.S. foreign policy. Regarding the South Caucasus, it is worth mentioning that Obama’s decision to “reset” relations with Russia consequently affected U.S. attitude towards the region.

U.S.-Armenia relations were marked with positive change, when the U.S. started pressuring Turkey over Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. Although the Turkish-Armenian protocols currently are frozen and both sides do not seem eager to continue this process, evaluating U.S.-Armenia relations in the framework of Armenian-Turkish reconciliation can be viewed in a mostly positive light, when one bears in mind the initial enthusiasm of the Armenian government in initiating bilateral relations with Turkey.

The U.S. is also still actively involved in the OSCE Minsk Group and is working towards ensuring that a new war over Nagorno-Karabagh does not materialize and destabilize the region. U.S. financial assistance to Nagorno-Karabagh also continues (it is the only country other than Armenia to provide financial support, clearly due to active Armenian lobbying efforts in Congress), although the former does not officially recognize Karabagh.

A commemorative stamp issued in honor of the murdered officials in the 1999 terrorist attack on Parliament.

Nevertheless, neither Armenia nor the South Caucasus as a whole has been top priorities for the U.S. Of course, there are some projects related to government reforms, democratization, rule of law, and civil society implemented by USAID. But for almost a decade now, Armenia has been losing the importance it once signified to the U.S. The South Caucasus are mostly seen from Washington as a bone of contention with Russia.

Yet, it’s reasonable to predict more involvement and a stronger desire on the part of the U.S. to deepen ties with Armenia in the near future. Now that President Serge Sarkisian has decided to embrace Putin’s Russia even more fondly with his September 2013 decision to join the Russia-led Customs Union, the U.S. will not want Russia to have complete and unchallenged dominance in the region, particularly in Armenia. There may not open confrontation with Russia, but we’re likely to see more active U.S. involvement in Armenia.

The role of the Armenian Diaspora and its effectiveness is of high importance for U.S.-Armenia relations, but Armenia here is the side that gains most. The Armenian Genocide, which is critically important for both Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora, still remains a sore point in U.S.-Armenia relations. U.S. leaders have time and again refused to officially recognize the genocide, and use it as leverage against Turkey. Obama hasn’t kept his promise of recognizing the Armenian Genocide, instead making references to attempts at Armenia-Turkey reconciliation. However, the closer we get to the 100^th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, the more tense Armenia-Turkey relations become. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is expected to visit Armenia as part of his regional tour at the end of 2014; the U.S. will most probably call for or even initiate another attempt at normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations, thus avoiding tensions and once again breaking Obama’s election-time promise. Expecting Obama to recognize the Armenian Genocide would be naïve; for, however bad or good its relations with Turkey, the latter is still one of the largest NATO members, with aspirations to lead the Middle East. The U.S. simply cannot afford to break ties with Turkey, as any loss from that move will outweigh the gains.

The Nagorno-Karabagh conflict is another important area of cooperation between Armenia and the U.S., which has always been active in the OSCE Minsk Group, advocating for a peace deal between the two sides. However, resolution of the conflict can hardly be dictated from third parties due to high risks of enflaming the region. Whatever the solution, Armenia and Azerbaijan should reach it themselves—and the U.S. seems to realize that.

Regarding economic cooperation with the U.S., Armenian Americans and other investors have raised concerns that the Armenian government does not take firm steps to secure foreign investments. Several local oligarchs almost entirely control the market, stifling the growth of startups. Investments are not entirely secure if they somehow hinder monopolies. There are three major factors that explain the lack of U.S. investment in the Armenian economy: the Armenian market is relatively small; Armenia continues to stay isolated, with its closed borders; and finally, many of the strategically important sectors are under the direct control of Russia.

Another key factor affecting overall U.S. relations with almost all of the countries involved is related to human rights. The U.S. has sometimes been critical towards human rights violations in Armenia, which has included excessive use of power by the government, clashes with police, restrictions on pluralism, political prisoners, electoral fraud, etc. However, overall the U.S. has not been critical enough, as it wishes to maintain good relations with Sarkisian. Priority is instead given to Turkey-Armenia relations and the Nagorno Karabagh conflict.

U.S.-Armenia relations have gone through ups and downs, but they have never been on the brink or at a peak. The political, economic, and military ties between the two countries can certainly be deepened, but this depends largely on the political will of the U.S. This political will, from another perspective, can be boosted by Armenia, which can increase the levels of cooperation as it needs more support from the West.

Notes

[1] Specter, Michael “Drift To Dictatorship Clouds Armenia’s Happiness,” New York Times, Jan. 3, 1997.

2 Knowlton, Bryan “Bush urges Congress to reject Armenian Genocide resolution,” New York Times, Oct. 10, 2007.

On Sept. 3, 2013, following a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, President Serge Sarkisian unexpectedly announced Armenia’s intention to join the Russian-led Customs Union (CU) comprised of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. In both Armenia and abroad, the decision was perceived as a sudden political U-Turn by Yerevan. But was this decision so unexpected?

Since the mid 1990’s, the Republic of Armenia has walked a long road of cooperation and interaction with the European Union (EU). The EU was seeking an increasingly close relationship with Armenia that would extend beyond cooperation, into a gradual economic integration and deepening of political ties. The European Commission put forward a concrete plan for enhancing its relations with the Eastern neighbors, including Armenia.

Armenian activists protest against Putin, and the regime’s decision to join the Customs Union. (Photo: Samson Martirosyan/The Armenian Weekly)

For three and a half years, officials from Yerevan and Brussels were negotiating the signing of the Association Agreement, as well as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). However, after the Sarkisian’s announcement, both parties faced a unique situation, one that could be described by the title of a book by the 19^th-century Russian philosopher, journalist, and literary critic Nikolai Chernyshevsky: “What Shall We Do?” This rhetorical question became a trending one, as Yerevan’s sudden decision brought classical chaos to the ongoing preparations towards the EU-Eastern Partnership (EaP) Vilnius Summit.

Before discussing the details of the agreements that were on the table and analyzing the possible consequences of the decision to join the CU, let us get better insight into the content of those agreements.

The Eastern Partnership initiative pursues the possibility of signing new association agreements that encompass the following key elements: deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with countries willing and able to enter into a deeper engagement, gradual integration in the EU economy, easier travel to the EU through visa liberalization, and the introduction of measures to tackle illegal immigration.

The negotiated Armenia-EU Association Agreement was an all encircling agreement that addressed numerous issues ranging from political association, political reforms, dialogue and cooperation on foreign and security policy issues, as well as economic cooperation and trade. Inter alia, it included cooperation in the fields of migration, rule of law, human rights, fight against crime and corruption, protection of personal data, and cooperation against trafficking and terrorism.

The DCFTA part of the negotiated agreement touched upon such fields as market competition, technical barriers for implementation of free trade, intellectual property rights, export duties, and restrictions, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, thus giving Armenia a unique opportunity to develop a European-oriented functioning national economy, which would enable it to overcome financial difficulties.

It is crucial to mention that Armenia and the EU had hosted seven rounds of negotiations until they finalized the talks on the Association Agreement and the DCFTA in mid July 2013. These two conceptual segments should be considered only in their common integrity; thus it is not appropriate even to discuss the signing of the Association Agreement without the DCFTA, an opinion that has been voiced by several Armenian politicians.

At a press conference following the 2nd European People’s Party Eastern Partnership Leaders’ Summit in Yerevan, Armenia, on Nov. 30, 2012. (Photo: President.am)

Simultaneously, once we are discussing the Eastern Partnership Program, we should bear in mind that it is a policy that seeks to create opportunities for everyone. The Eastern Partnership is not a copy-paste approach. It is a different attitude from the EU towards the Eastern neighbors. Concurrently, ­­­since its foundation the Eastern Partnership has been and is about the political association based on shared European values, which the Eastern neighbors would commit to enroot in their own affairs and enact in the spirit of the principle “more for more.”

Within the framework of its participation in the EaP, Armenia undertook several vital reforms ahead of the Vilnius Summit. Unfortunately, the Vilnius Summit did not become a triumph point for Armenia and its foreign policy. Nonetheless, it is imperative to highlight the reasons and grounds that forced the Armenian authorities to step away from the European path.

“Will something like #EuroMaidan ever happen in Armenia?” is the trending question amongst the Armenian political circles. My resounding reply is NO! Unfortunately, all the political forces and parties in Armenia seek Moscow’s support/assistance/patronage in order to come to power. After the Sept. 3 announcement, the Armenian political opposition did not have a sufficient reaction to the president’s declaration. The opposition parties failed to organize a pro-European march or meetings.
One may argue that the opposition leaders were thinking that the president’s announcement was not definitive but rather declarative. Sadly, Putin is a “very charming” person and in practice it is almost impossible to go against his word.

In this context, the Armenian pro-European civil society organizations, activists, young people, students attempted to take the lead, but unfortunately, after their rally on Sept. 5, 2013, in front of the Presidential Palace and the Head Office of the Republican Party of Armenia (ruling party and majority group at the National Assembly of Armenia), several activists were badly beaten by unknown thugs. The police are still investigating the cases without any results.

These developments created a circumstance wherein all the political groups reached a deadlock. They neither have any human resources, nor a concrete ideological/propaganda tool to instigate pro-European rallies in the city squares. Even the ruling Republican Party, which is a daughter organization of the European Peoples’ Party, is now paralyzed, as its continued membership to the EPP is unclear: Does the EPP, the biggest political group in the European Parliament, want a political ally that has suddenly turned its back to the EU? This is another rhetorical question, which is probably already decided in Brussels.

If we compare the above-mentioned Armenian case with the Ukrainian developments, we would see that in Ukraine there are pro-European political parties (such as “Batkivshchyna” and “UDAR”), as well as nationalistic parties (such as “Svoboda” party), which have strong connections with their European counterparts. Hence, they were able to effectively use pro-European propaganda to gather hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians in the city centers, which led to the overthrow of Yanukovych’s bloody regime.

Another important aspect, which should be considered while discussing Armenia’s U-Turn, is the security concept. Although Yerevan has never stated that the decision to join the Russian-led Customs Union was connected to the rising pressure exercised by Russia in the security sphere, for a common researcher this is the most visible and realistic point that solidly explains Armenia’s decision.

On numerous occasions, high-ranking EU officials have stated their position in regards to the Nagorno-Karabagh issue. The EU has supported a peaceful dialogue based on the principles of international law and the framework set forth by the OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by the U.S., Russia, and France. However, the security aspect remains one of the weakest points of Armenia’s external policy. The Armenian public, as well as the politicians, consider Russia as the guarantor of peace in the South Caucasus.

In my opinion, however, the Sept. 3 decision has brought mostly insecurity. Yes, Russia is one of the strongest players in the South Caucasus, and Armenia is considered to be its closest ally in the

On Sept. 3, 2013, following a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, President Serge Sarkisian announced Armenia would join the Russian-led Customs Union. (Photo: President.am)

region. However, Russia’s decision to sell huge amounts of advanced weaponry to Azerbaijan (for around $2 billion USD), its signing of a series (around 16) of bilateral agreements within different fields, and finally Putin’s visit to Baku, all had a direct impact on Yerevan’s decision-making. There were huge concerns that Azerbaijan was getting ready to launch a widespread military operation on the borderlands with Armenia, which could have had disastrous effects on regional security. These concerns and the threat of a new military conflict was the main playing card that Putin used to achieve his desired results. However, the security concerns should have been on the minds of Armenia’s political elite when they were enthusiastically negotiating the Association Agreement and the DCFTA with the EU.

If in the beginning European officials and the EU itself were disappointed with Yerevan’s decision, later on this disappointment simply turned into a lack of interest towards Armenia. In mid-October 2013, there were intensive public discussions that Armenia would not be invited to the upcoming EU-EaP Vilnius Summit in November 2013, or that Armenia would simply decide not to participate, under Russian pressure. Fortunately, these all remained rumors and the Armenian delegation headed by President Sarkisian participated in the EU-EaP Vilnius Summit.

In international politics and diplomacy, summit results are achieved during the years of cooperation and commitment of the involved parties. The EU-EaP Vilnius Summit was a landmark event in this context, as first it destroyed the myths that the Association Agreements and DCFTA’s are secret documents not accessible by the public. Moreover, the Vilnius Summit was a half success and half failure. The EU gained better knowledge and experience about how to approach each partner country. At the end, Armenia and the EU presented a joint statement. The Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward Nalbandian and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton exchanged the Association Agreement and the DCFTA’s texts to underline the difficult road these partners had passed together.

Since the beginning of 2014, the Armenian government has implemented several key actions aimed to fostering Armenia’s membership in the Russian-led Customs Union. A special road map of actions has been agreed to by the parties involved and several legislative reforms are being introduced to move Armenia towards joining the CU.

Without expressing any approach to these developments, as a conclusion, we should once again highlight the importance of the Eastern Partnership Program, as a sustainable guarantee for achieving European standards in all fields of life for the Armenian people. Our Armenian society and people should stand firm and respect the values we have proclaimed in our constitution and stipulated in various international treaties.

Simultaneously, if the European Union wants to achieve more tangible and long-term success in Armenia and bring the country back to “the European tracks,” it should try to put more emphasis and impetus on the following points:

1) Ensure the sustainability of the reforms. Over the last four years, various reforms and EU-funded projects have been launched and implemented in Armenia.¹ However, the sustainability of all implemented programs and reforms should be considered as a high priority for the EU in a long-term strategy, as sustained and visible results may make a strong argument for boosting more systematic multilateral dialogue.

2) Empower the EaP partners to be sovereign, both politically and structurally. The Sept. 3 decision was a result of not only a weak and unclear Armenian foreign policy, but also of a lack of political guarantees and support coming from the EU. The above-mentioned reforms should first benefit the Armenian government and allow it to feel more sovereign in domestic and international affairs, and should avoid the loss of sovereignty in case it becomes a member of the Customs Union.

Finally, there is no justification for Russia intervening in EaP affairs, but EaP countries should voice their disagreement with Moscow first. The future of the European Union and the Eastern Partnership countries lies in an improved and more equal Europe. The times of limited sovereignty in Europe is over; however, to make this statement work more effectively in practice, the EU and the EaP countries should be united in their willingness to see a better Europe for all.

Notes

1.  See the list at http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/projects/list_of_projects/projects_en.htm.

The Armenian Weekly March 2014 Magazine:
Armenia’s Foreign Policy in Focus

Some circumstances never change. Wedged between two empires for much of its long history, Armenia continues to navigate through the waves created by two gargantuan vessels—this time, Russia and the West.

Cover of the Armenian Weekly March 2014 magazine on Armenia’s foreign policy

On March 18, Russian President Vladimir Putin reclaimed Crimea as part of his country, giving rise to condemnations by the West and setting in motion policies towards the isolation of Russia. In a passionate address that encapsulated years of resentment and exasperation, Putin signaled to the world that a renewed, bolder Russia had emerged.

“If you press a spring too hard, it will recoil,” Putin said. “They cheated us again and again, made decisions behind our back… That’s the way it was with the expansion of NATO in the East, with the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders. They always told us the same thing: ‘Well, this doesn’t involve you.’”

With tensions flaring up, President Serge Sarkisian’s administration has erred on the side of the familiar, Putin’s new Russia. A day after Putin’s address, Sarkisian endorsed the move during a phone conversation with the Russian leader, saying he viewed the Crimean referendum as “yet another realization of peoples’ right to self-determination.”

When in early September 2013, Sarkisian announced Armenia’s intentions to join the Russian-led Customs Union, the decision came as a surprise to many. After ongoing talks with the European Union on the signing of the Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), Armenia did a 180-degree turn, to the disappointment of those who saw the EU partnership as a way to improve the country’s internal woes and shortcomings—from fighting rampant corruption to improving the country’s human rights record. On the flip side, however, is Russia’s military backing, especially if renewed violence erupts on the Azerbaijani front.

Armenia’s geopolitical circumstances are complex—jammed between two hostile neighbors (Turkey and Azerbaijan), with less than ideal relations with Georgia, and with neighboring Iran isolated and on the receiving end of sanctions imposed by the West. In that light, Russia appears as a guarantor of some form of survival. The question is, at what cost? Armenia, as the saying goes, stands between the devil and the deep blue sea.

In these turbulent times, it is necessary to take a hard look at Armenia’s foreign policy—from the protocols to the EU talks to, finally, the Customs Union. Here, we present eight articles—some opinion pieces and some analysis—that we hope will offer valuable perspectives on the country’s foreign policy.

Click on the titles below to view the articles:

Farewell to Complementarity: Armenia’s Foreign Policy at a crossroads
By Khatchik DerGhougassian

All Quiet on the Western Front? Another Look at the Armeno-Turkish Protocols, and Where We Stand Today
By Antranig Kasbarian

Reflections on the Killing of Junior Sergeant Armen L. Hovhannisyan
By Michael G. Mensoian

Serge Sarkisian’s Catalogue of Failures: A Brief Foreign Policy Survey
By Emil Sanamyan

Armenia’s Emerging New Foreign Policy
By Armen Sahakyan

Armenia-US Relations: Unfulfilled Promise
By Kate Nahapetian

Armenia-EU Relations: ‘What Shall We Do?’
By Armenak Minasyants

US-Armenia: Evolution of Bilateral Relations
By Samson Martirosyan

Special for the Armenian Weekly

Despite an impressive 2:0 home win at Signal Iduna Park in Dortmund on April 8, Henrikh Mkhitaryan and his Borussia Dortmund team crashed out of the UEFA Champions League quarter finals, losing by an aggregate score line of 3:2 to a Real Madrid side, which was without the injured Cristiano Ronaldo.

Mkhitaryan (Photo: www.facebook.com/MkhitaryanOfficial)

Trailing 3:0 from the first leg which was played in Madrid a week earlier, Dortmund had it all to do. Dortmund’s coach Jürgen Klopp hailed his players for their incredible performance despite being unable to overturn the deficit they had found themselves in.

Real Madrid was unable to convert a first half penalty kick which would have left Dortmund needing five goals (due to the away goal tiebreaker). Angel di Maria saw his effort saved by Dortmund’s keeper Roman Weidenfeller to the delight of the infamously noisy and partisan Dortmund crowd. The save spurred the Dortmund players on and by half time they had reduced the deficit to one goal. Marco Reus was the man who took charge of the tie, bagging a brace of goals which had everyone in Dortmund believing in the impossible.

In fact, Dortmund was unlucky not to be level by half time. Henrikh Mkhitaryan spurned a terrific opportunity in front of goal. Robert Lewandowski’s terrific work on the left fashioned the chance for Mkhitaryan, but his sharp side footed effort flashed inches past the near post and wide.

The second half saw more of the same tactics from Dortmund. Pressure high up the pitch from the Dortmund attack was causing Sergio Ramos and Pepe untold trouble in the center of the Real Madrid defense, as they continued to cough up cheap possession in their own half.

Marco Reus continued to be the bright spark for Dortmund, as he excellently threaded a ball through to Henrikh in the box. Mkhitaryan skipped past Iker Casillas in the Madrid goal and with the back of the net at his mercy was unable to stroke the ball home. His left footed shot cannoned of the base of the post and the ensuing scramble was dealt with by the Madrid defense.

Moments later another guilt edged chance fell to the feet of the Armenian but this time his effort was denied by Casillas. Dortmund continued to press in the final quarter of an hour, and they were lucky not to be caught on the break on a few occasions, with the speedy Welshman Gareth Bale always posing a threat.

The final whistle blew with Dortmund winning the tie 2:0, and shutting out the potent Madrid attack for the first time in an incredible 34 Champions League matches. A moral victory on the night, but ultimately not enough as the home side fell to a 3:2 aggregate defeat and Real Madrid marched on the semifinal stage.

Having tasted Champions League football in previous seasons with his former club Shakhtar Donetsk, Mkhitaryan had the chance with his new club to go deeper into the knock out stages than before. He was presented with glorious chances to have the name Mkhitaryan adorn every back page across Europe, but unfortunately, he was unable to follow the Hollywood script. The normally clinical front man left his shooting boots at home and will be left to rue a missed opportunity to join Europe’s elite players at the semifinal stage.

For Dortmund, continuing their recent Champions League success will become more and more difficult. Last year they lost Mario Götse to Bayern Munich and this year they are set to lose Robert Lewandowski to the same German powerhouse. Who knows if Marco Reus and even the coach Jürgen Klopp will be on the move during the next transfer window?

For Mkhitaryan, tonight’s result will sting badly. Henrikh gained valuable Champions League experience this season and although it was a tough lesson, he’ll now know what it takes to reach the next level.

Borussia Dortmund: Weidenfeller, Piszczek (Aubemeyang 81’), Friedrich, Hummels, Durm, Jojic, Kirch, Grosskreutz, Mkhitaryan, Reus, Lewandowski

Coach: Klopp

Real Madrid:  Casillas, Carvajal (YC), Pepe, Ramos (YC), Coentrao, Illarremendi (Isco 46’), Alonso (YC), Modric, di Maria (Casemiro 73’), Benzema (YC) (Varane 90’), Bale

Coach: Ancelotti

WASHINGTON, DC—On March 25, 2014, the Armenian Relief Society (ARS) “Satenig” chapter and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) “Sebouh” Gomideh hosted a town hall meeting with ARS Central Executive Board member Zepure Reisian from Aleppo, Syria, to update the community on the dire circumstances faced by the Armenians throughout Syria and to appeal to the Washington DC community for their continued support of the relief efforts.  The chairman of the Sebouh Gomideh, Alex Der Alexanian, welcomed the community and introduced Sevan Kolejian, vice president of the Eastern Region ARS to introduce the speaker, ARS Central Executive member, Zepure Reisian.

Ungerouhi Zepure E. Reisian and members of the ARS “Satenig” Chapter

Reisian spoke extensively about the Armenian community of Aleppo, and the conditions on the ground through the last three years. The community has endured extremely difficult circumstances including, scarce resources like water, food, medicine, gas, and electricity; skyrocketing prices of any goods available; and an overall sense of instability.  Schools have consolidated and are operating in tight quarters, hospitals closed and most doctors have left the country, and worst of all, the constant barrage of mortar attacks.

A scene from the event

Reisian talked about ARS’s long standing efforts to provide aid for the community. The ARS in the United States and Canada have stepped up and helped their brethren in Syria and continue to do so. Since the start of the conflict in Syria in 2011, all Armenian organizations in Aleppo have come together to form the  Syrian Armenian Emergency Relief and Recovery Committee to collect and distribute aid to those in need within the community.  ”Despite all the terrible things the people went through, the community survived. The help from the Diaspora was crucial for their survival,” she said.  Aleppo is an important diasporan community.  It received the Armenians directly after the Genocide and has been a center of Armenian culture and community.”

After Reisian concluded her remarks, the Armenian National Committee of America’s (ANCA) Kate Nahapetian spoke about the political efforts being undertaken by the ANCA and urged everyone to sign up on the ANCA email list and take immediate action to petition President Barak Obama to stop Turkey’s aggression on the Armenian people of Kessab.  She also encouraged the community to give generously to the relief efforts, and invited community members to contact her in order to facilitate meetings with local members of Congress to voice their concerns.

After a brief question and answer session, the event came to a close with many Washington DC area community members having pledged their continued support to the efforts to help our Syrian Armenian brothers and sisters. Audience members opened their hearts and made generous contributions toward Syrian relief efforts.  The ARF and ARS of Washington DC would like to convey their gratitude to all community members who made generous pledges of support as well as to Aline Barsoumian for translating Reisian’s speech to English. If you would like to make a contribution, please visit the ARS website www.arseastusa.org and donate to the Fund for Syrian Relief.