On Sept. 3, 2013, following a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, President Serge Sarkisian unexpectedly announced Armenia’s intention to join the Russian-led Customs Union (CU) comprised of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. In both Armenia and abroad, the decision was perceived as a sudden political U-Turn by Yerevan. But was this decision so unexpected?
Since the mid 1990’s, the Republic of Armenia has walked a long road of cooperation and interaction with the European Union (EU). The EU was seeking an increasingly close relationship with Armenia that would extend beyond cooperation, into a gradual economic integration and deepening of political ties. The European Commission put forward a concrete plan for enhancing its relations with the Eastern neighbors, including Armenia.
Armenian activists protest against Putin, and the regime’s decision to join the Customs Union. (Photo: Samson Martirosyan/The Armenian Weekly)
For three and a half years, officials from Yerevan and Brussels were negotiating the signing of the Association Agreement, as well as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). However, after the Sarkisian’s announcement, both parties faced a unique situation, one that could be described by the title of a book by the 19th-century Russian philosopher, journalist, and literary critic Nikolai Chernyshevsky: “What Shall We Do?” This rhetorical question became a trending one, as Yerevan’s sudden decision brought classical chaos to the ongoing preparations towards the EU-Eastern Partnership (EaP) Vilnius Summit.
Before discussing the details of the agreements that were on the table and analyzing the possible consequences of the decision to join the CU, let us get better insight into the content of those agreements.
The Eastern Partnership initiative pursues the possibility of signing new association agreements that encompass the following key elements: deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with countries willing and able to enter into a deeper engagement, gradual integration in the EU economy, easier travel to the EU through visa liberalization, and the introduction of measures to tackle illegal immigration.
The negotiated Armenia-EU Association Agreement was an all encircling agreement that addressed numerous issues ranging from political association, political reforms, dialogue and cooperation on foreign and security policy issues, as well as economic cooperation and trade. Inter alia, it included cooperation in the fields of migration, rule of law, human rights, fight against crime and corruption, protection of personal data, and cooperation against trafficking and terrorism.
The DCFTA part of the negotiated agreement touched upon such fields as market competition, technical barriers for implementation of free trade, intellectual property rights, export duties, and restrictions, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, thus giving Armenia a unique opportunity to develop a European-oriented functioning national economy, which would enable it to overcome financial difficulties.
It is crucial to mention that Armenia and the EU had hosted seven rounds of negotiations until they finalized the talks on the Association Agreement and the DCFTA in mid July 2013. These two conceptual segments should be considered only in their common integrity; thus it is not appropriate even to discuss the signing of the Association Agreement without the DCFTA, an opinion that has been voiced by several Armenian politicians.
At a press conference following the 2nd European People’s Party Eastern Partnership Leaders’ Summit in Yerevan, Armenia, on Nov. 30, 2012. (Photo: President.am)
Simultaneously, once we are discussing the Eastern Partnership Program, we should bear in mind that it is a policy that seeks to create opportunities for everyone. The Eastern Partnership is not a copy-paste approach. It is a different attitude from the EU towards the Eastern neighbors. Concurrently, since its foundation the Eastern Partnership has been and is about the political association based on shared European values, which the Eastern neighbors would commit to enroot in their own affairs and enact in the spirit of the principle “more for more.”
Within the framework of its participation in the EaP, Armenia undertook several vital reforms ahead of the Vilnius Summit. Unfortunately, the Vilnius Summit did not become a triumph point for Armenia and its foreign policy. Nonetheless, it is imperative to highlight the reasons and grounds that forced the Armenian authorities to step away from the European path.
“Will something like #EuroMaidan ever happen in Armenia?” is the trending question amongst the Armenian political circles. My resounding reply is NO! Unfortunately, all the political forces and parties in Armenia seek Moscow’s support/assistance/patronage in order to come to power. After the Sept. 3 announcement, the Armenian political opposition did not have a sufficient reaction to the president’s declaration. The opposition parties failed to organize a pro-European march or meetings.
One may argue that the opposition leaders were thinking that the president’s announcement was not definitive but rather declarative. Sadly, Putin is a “very charming” person and in practice it is almost impossible to go against his word.
In this context, the Armenian pro-European civil society organizations, activists, young people, students attempted to take the lead, but unfortunately, after their rally on Sept. 5, 2013, in front of the Presidential Palace and the Head Office of the Republican Party of Armenia (ruling party and majority group at the National Assembly of Armenia), several activists were badly beaten by unknown thugs. The police are still investigating the cases without any results.
These developments created a circumstance wherein all the political groups reached a deadlock. They neither have any human resources, nor a concrete ideological/propaganda tool to instigate pro-European rallies in the city squares. Even the ruling Republican Party, which is a daughter organization of the European Peoples’ Party, is now paralyzed, as its continued membership to the EPP is unclear: Does the EPP, the biggest political group in the European Parliament, want a political ally that has suddenly turned its back to the EU? This is another rhetorical question, which is probably already decided in Brussels.
If we compare the above-mentioned Armenian case with the Ukrainian developments, we would see that in Ukraine there are pro-European political parties (such as “Batkivshchyna” and “UDAR”), as well as nationalistic parties (such as “Svoboda” party), which have strong connections with their European counterparts. Hence, they were able to effectively use pro-European propaganda to gather hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians in the city centers, which led to the overthrow of Yanukovych’s bloody regime.
Another important aspect, which should be considered while discussing Armenia’s U-Turn, is the security concept. Although Yerevan has never stated that the decision to join the Russian-led Customs Union was connected to the rising pressure exercised by Russia in the security sphere, for a common researcher this is the most visible and realistic point that solidly explains Armenia’s decision.
On numerous occasions, high-ranking EU officials have stated their position in regards to the Nagorno-Karabagh issue. The EU has supported a peaceful dialogue based on the principles of international law and the framework set forth by the OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by the U.S., Russia, and France. However, the security aspect remains one of the weakest points of Armenia’s external policy. The Armenian public, as well as the politicians, consider Russia as the guarantor of peace in the South Caucasus.
In my opinion, however, the Sept. 3 decision has brought mostly insecurity. Yes, Russia is one of the strongest players in the South Caucasus, and Armenia is considered to be its closest ally in the
On Sept. 3, 2013, following a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, President Serge Sarkisian announced Armenia would join the Russian-led Customs Union. (Photo: President.am)
region. However, Russia’s decision to sell huge amounts of advanced weaponry to Azerbaijan (for around $2 billion USD), its signing of a series (around 16) of bilateral agreements within different fields, and finally Putin’s visit to Baku, all had a direct impact on Yerevan’s decision-making. There were huge concerns that Azerbaijan was getting ready to launch a widespread military operation on the borderlands with Armenia, which could have had disastrous effects on regional security. These concerns and the threat of a new military conflict was the main playing card that Putin used to achieve his desired results. However, the security concerns should have been on the minds of Armenia’s political elite when they were enthusiastically negotiating the Association Agreement and the DCFTA with the EU.
If in the beginning European officials and the EU itself were disappointed with Yerevan’s decision, later on this disappointment simply turned into a lack of interest towards Armenia. In mid-October 2013, there were intensive public discussions that Armenia would not be invited to the upcoming EU-EaP Vilnius Summit in November 2013, or that Armenia would simply decide not to participate, under Russian pressure. Fortunately, these all remained rumors and the Armenian delegation headed by President Sarkisian participated in the EU-EaP Vilnius Summit.
In international politics and diplomacy, summit results are achieved during the years of cooperation and commitment of the involved parties. The EU-EaP Vilnius Summit was a landmark event in this context, as first it destroyed the myths that the Association Agreements and DCFTA’s are secret documents not accessible by the public. Moreover, the Vilnius Summit was a half success and half failure. The EU gained better knowledge and experience about how to approach each partner country. At the end, Armenia and the EU presented a joint statement. The Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward Nalbandian and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton exchanged the Association Agreement and the DCFTA’s texts to underline the difficult road these partners had passed together.
Since the beginning of 2014, the Armenian government has implemented several key actions aimed to fostering Armenia’s membership in the Russian-led Customs Union. A special road map of actions has been agreed to by the parties involved and several legislative reforms are being introduced to move Armenia towards joining the CU.
Without expressing any approach to these developments, as a conclusion, we should once again highlight the importance of the Eastern Partnership Program, as a sustainable guarantee for achieving European standards in all fields of life for the Armenian people. Our Armenian society and people should stand firm and respect the values we have proclaimed in our constitution and stipulated in various international treaties.
Simultaneously, if the European Union wants to achieve more tangible and long-term success in Armenia and bring the country back to “the European tracks,” it should try to put more emphasis and impetus on the following points:
1) Ensure the sustainability of the reforms. Over the last four years, various reforms and EU-funded projects have been launched and implemented in Armenia.1 However, the sustainability of all implemented programs and reforms should be considered as a high priority for the EU in a long-term strategy, as sustained and visible results may make a strong argument for boosting more systematic multilateral dialogue.
2) Empower the EaP partners to be sovereign, both politically and structurally. The Sept. 3 decision was a result of not only a weak and unclear Armenian foreign policy, but also of a lack of political guarantees and support coming from the EU. The above-mentioned reforms should first benefit the Armenian government and allow it to feel more sovereign in domestic and international affairs, and should avoid the loss of sovereignty in case it becomes a member of the Customs Union.
Finally, there is no justification for Russia intervening in EaP affairs, but EaP countries should voice their disagreement with Moscow first. The future of the European Union and the Eastern Partnership countries lies in an improved and more equal Europe. The times of limited sovereignty in Europe is over; however, to make this statement work more effectively in practice, the EU and the EaP countries should be united in their willingness to see a better Europe for all.
Notes
1. See the list at http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/projects/list_of_projects/projects_en.htm.