The Armenian Weekly March 2014 Magazine:
Armenia’s Foreign Policy in Focus
According to the Karabagh Ministry of Defense, Junior Sergeant Armen L. Hovhannisyan was killed on Jan. 20, 2014 repelling an Azeri force engaged in a probing action against Karabagh defensive positions along the Line of Contact (LoC). In recognition of his exemplary action in protecting his country, President Bako Sahakian awarded Sgt. Hovhannisyan Karabagh’s Medal of Courage. He was buried with full military honors in the Yerablur Military Pantheon in Yerevan, Armenia.
Junior sergeant Armen L. Hovhannisyan
How many more young men in uniform are to be killed by the Azeri military before action takes the place of rhetoric? A measured response that sends an unambiguous message not only to the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, but to the provocateur Azerbaijan that these continuing border aggressions are counterproductive to a negotiated settlement.
Fearful of losing more land to the Karabagh Armenians, Azerbaijan signed the ceasefire that took effect in 1994. Evidently the Azeri leadership is still suffering the anguish of its embarrassing defeat to the Armenians. These constant violations along the LoC; the killing of Armenian soldiers by sniper fire; and the harassment by gunfire of Armenian civilians who live and work their fields close to the border are meant to assuage the anguish that still lingers. More to the point, however, is the need by President Aliyev to “save face”; his people surely recognize the disconnect between the rhetoric of their fearless leader and his inability to regain Artsakh (Karabagh).
The tepid responses by the co-chairs have served to encourage rather than deter such actions. On Jan. 15, 2014, during a planned monitoring of the positions along the LoC, Azerbaijan—with impunity—prevented the OSCE mission from visiting the front lines in the occupied area of the Martuni district facing the Karabagh settlement of Kuropatkin. This is a strategic sector on the LoC located just north of Martuni, the administrative capital. These front-line positions are the closest Azeri positions to Stepanakert, Artsakh’s capital. This fact may have been sufficient reason for the Azeris to deny access to the OSCE monitors. Or possibly that their generalissimo, Ilham Aliyev, is in complete control of the situation.
The latest provocation on the border that resulted in the killing of Sgt. Hovhannisyan occurred within days of a foreign ministers’ meeting in Paris between Edward Nalbandian and Elmar Mammadyrov. It would have been appropriate (and not an extreme response) for President Sarkisian to have used this unfortunate incident to call off the meeting, as well as to question the value of any meeting with Aliyev in the near future.
This raises the question that seems to elude an answer: How can the Minsk Group co-chairs expect a peaceful resolution of Artsakh’s status given the constant flow of inflammatory rhetoric by Aliyev; the massive military build-up that he continually threatens to use; and the flagrant violations of the ceasefire agreement that targets both military personnel and innocent civilians in the border regions of both Artsakh and Armenia? When the Minsk Group co-chairs do respond to Azerbaijan’s transgressions, their mealy-mouthed approach is to lecture both the provocateur Azerbaijan and the victims, Artsakh and Armenia.
How can the co-chairs, who were to meet with Nalbandian in Yerevan several weeks after this latest provocation, entertain the notion that Artsakh’s independence can be negotiated away? I say “negotiated away” because there is no principle guiding the negotiations (that has been divulged) that addresses Artsakh’s future status as a sovereign entity. Here was an opportunity, if a protest demonstration was to be held in Yerevan, to stress Artsakh’s right to independence—the subtext being that Artsakh is prepared to withstand any action by Azerbaijan that compromises its independence. That should also be the subtext of any understanding that comes out of any meetings with the co-chairs. This may be viewed as an extremely strong position to take, but Armenia is at a showdown moment in its history. Has our nation risen from its near obliteration from the genocide to now, meek and mute, wait while other nations decide its future? Our forebears would weep at our timidity and lack of resolve. Russia may control (for the present) our government in Armenia, but surely Russia does not control our determination and spirit. This is precisely what has kept us a vibrant and recognizable nation for millennia.
Why we skirt around this issue of ultimate independence for Artsakh is baffling. We should not lose sight of the fact that the negotiation process does not include any option for recognizing Artsakh’s sovereignty other than reference to a vote sometime in the future to determine Karabagh’s—not Artsakh’s—status after a treaty has been signed.
Arriving at that treaty, however, is predicated on the withdrawal of our military forces from the liberated territories; the right of return of displaced Azeris to Artsakh; the guarantee of a secure land route (possibly two) between Armenia and Karabagh (which we already have); and the occupation of the liberated territories and Karabagh by an international peacekeeping force. At that point, the military advantage would have shifted decisively to Azerbaijan.
Once our forces have withdrawn from the liberated territories, they will be lost to us forever. It is also likely that Shahumian will not be returned to Karabagh; return of the Azeri-occupied border regions of Martakert and Martuni is questionable. Unfortunately, these are needless worries. By the time the vote to determine Karabagh’s—not Artsakh’s—status is actually held, Azeris will form a majority of the population. And independence will never be supported by the majority Azeri voters. The best-case scenario for Armenians is that Karabagh may gain limited local autonomy as a region within Azerbaijan, which Baku will suspend whenever it determines the time is right.
A scene from Junior Sergeant Armen Hovhannisyan’s funeral.
Within a generation following this meaningless vote, Karabagh will be overrun by more Azeris under what we should expect will be a government-sponsored resettlement program that aims to reduce the Armenian population to an impotent minority on its own lands. Given this foreseeable development, we will be forced to witness Karabagh become another Nakhitchevan. One more historic Armenian land purged of Armenians. Is this why some 7,000 brave azatamartiks sacrificed their lives, with countless others suffering debilitating wounds?
If we cannot (at least, for the present) overcome the political realities that prevent the de jure recognition of Artsakh, then continuing to engage in a holding action—maintaining the status quo—is our only recourse. It has been 20 years since the 1994 ceasefire. However, the future years must witness a meaningful expansion and diversification of Artsakh’s economy and an accelerated increase in its population that will yield an independent Artsakh as a fait accompli. Embracing these objectives is an absolute necessity. Unfortunately there can never be a guarantee, but short of the de jure recognition that still remains a possibility or defeating Azerbaijan a second time, are there other options available?
It is unfortunate that we have never sought to provide a properly documented legal basis to support the right of the Karabagh Armenians to declare their independence based on the Soviet Constitution in force at the time; or on the internationally accepted principle of self-determination; or on the principle of remedial secession. If that right had been established, the negotiations would be dealing with indemnification, boundary adjustments, etc., rather than the nebulous future status of Artsakh.
Secondly, the principle of territorial integrity that is continually referred to by Azerbaijan with the implication that this is an Armenian irredenta issue is a red herring. We have unwittingly allowed Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations which states that “All Members shall refrain…from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity…of any State…” to muddy the waters. Artsakh is not a sovereign State, therefore this principle cannot apply. Neither should it apply to Armenia. Armenia is a sovereign State, but Armenia neither threatened nor used force against the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Its presence in Artsakh was based on the principle of humanitarian intervention. Its intervention prevented the indiscriminate killing, perhaps another genocide of the Armenian population in Artsakh under cover of a war begun by Azerbaijan. Does this sound familiar? Its continued presence and support serves as a deterrent against an Azeri military force that poses a direct and immediate threat to the Artsakh Armenians as numerous violations along the LoC amply attest. Yet, Armenia has not attempted to justify its role in Artsakh based on the principle of humanitarian intervention.
The killing of Sgt. Hovannisian is not some isolated event without historic meaning. He gave his life in the continuing struggle that we are engaged in with those who still seek to destroy us as a nation. Today there is no cause with greater meaning than the de jure recognition of Artsakh’s independence. The credibility of Hai Tahd and the future of Armenia are intimately related to the land that Junior Sergeant Hovannisian was killed protecting.