Another look at the Armeno-Turkish protocols, and where we stand today
The Armenian Weekly March 2014 Magazine:
Armenia’s Foreign Policy in Focus
IT SEEMS LIKE YESTERDAY when Armenians worldwide loudly condemned the protocols signed by Armenia and Turkey, which ostensibly sought to normalize relations between the two neighboring states.
A boy holds a poster that reads, “No to the Turkish preconditions,” during a demonstration organized by the ARF in Yerevan, in Jan. 2010. (Photo: Inna Mekhitarian-Hairenik/Armenian Weekly)
And yet, it is a fact that four years have passed, with the issue held in suspended animation, lacking parliamentary ratification from either side, despite the signature of both foreign ministers.
I have no desire to rehash the details of these protocols—a failed document from numerous standpoints. Suffice it to say that now, as then, the protocols jeopardize Armenia’s sovereignty and claims to justice by a) rendering the Armenian Genocide debatable; b) declaring null and void any Armenian territorial claims of Turkey; and c) implicitly authorizing Turkey to play a role in Armenia’s dispute with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabagh—all, presumably, for the sake of reopening the Armeno-Turkish border and restoring full diplomatic and economic relations.
What interests me now is why each country remains quiet on this matter, taking no appreciable steps toward resolution, nor even discussing the protocols, except when the question is raised by journalists. Such deafening silence cannot be incidental. Rather, it points to the protocols as a tactical, rather than strategic or fundamental, document. That is, Turkey and its allies, in all likelihood, saw a tactical opening in 2009, sized up the situation accordingly, and put forth a proposal that was a “win-win,” no matter how it ultimately fared. To wit:
—They likely saw President Serge Sarkisian’s regime for what it was (and is): a) a regime with tarnished legitimacy following the ugly 2008 presidential elections; b) a regime whose demonstrated reflexes in matters of diplomacy were passive, sluggish, and often conciliatory; and c) a regime that desperately sought to produce something new, such as an open border with Turkey, to demonstrate its openness internationally, and as a public relations remedy for its own underperforming economy.
—They asked for things fundamental (e.g., renunciation of territorial claims) in return for something that is tactical and reversible at any time (opening of borders). Moreover, the opening of borders was ballyhooed as an end in itself, an inherent good, when the all-important details (e.g., terms of trade, tariff regimes, export subsidies) had not been researched.
—Above all, the protocols enabled Turkey, Switzerland, the U.S., and others to claim that a “process” was underway, aiming to patch up the two nations’ differences. This thereby undermined Armenian advocacy for genocide recognition and related issues. It was not hard, after all, to label such advocacy as counterproductive, if they stood in the way of what seemed to be tangible progress.
So what now? From the looks of it, Turkey is not interested—at least not at this time—in advancing the protocols. Perhaps this is due, in part, to protests from Azerbaijan, which is concerned that an open border with Turkey could relieve pressure from its own blockade on Armenia’s eastern front. Or perhaps Turkey is biding its time, waiting for the next opportune moment to raise the matter again, for who knows what purpose. In any case, it has not been debated inside Turkey for many months now.
On Oct. 10, 2009, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian (left) and his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu sign the protocols. (Photo: Photolure)
The Armenian side, meanwhile, is trying to pretend the protocols never happened—almost like a bad dream or headache. When questioned by critics, government officials usually brush them off, to the effect of, “Why do you even raise this matter? Let sleeping dogs lie.” Unfortunately, the protocols are not something that can be wished away; unless President Sarkisian instructs his foreign minister to withdraw his signature, Turkey may revive the protocols process at any time, leaving Armenia in a situation where it would have to follow suit or say “no,” thus inviting outside scrutiny and pressure.
Much better would be a pro-active position, for example, withdrawing support for the protocols by citing Turkey’s own lack of sincerity in heating up then cooling down the issue. This, in fact, would simply follow through on Sarkisian’s own pronouncements in 2009-10, when, under a firestorm of diasporan criticism, he assured audiences that Armenia would withdraw if it sensed that Turkey was not promptly acting on its stated intentions. We are still waiting for this to materialize…
Meanwhile, it appears that “business-as-usual” is the order of the day, on this, the eve of the genocide centennial. Turkey continues to dart and weave like a trained boxer, sometimes friendly and sometimes hostile, sometimes alluding to dark pages of its past and the vague need for redress, at other times continuing its aggressive anti-Armenian rhetoric and posture, all the while firmly rooting its tactics in the culture of denial.
Armenia, meanwhile, seems timid, unfocused, and determined not to rock the boat. Even the formation of a government-sanctioned committee for the centennial, a seemingly welcome initiative, has thus far been a formality, organizing the usual conferences and seminars without an innovative edge in style or in substance. Carrying the agenda forward—from recognition to reparations and toward eventual restitution—seems, alas, to be left to the diaspora. This is truly unfortunate, for without Armenia’s leadership, our work in this area will remain pointed uphill.
There is still time, but the clock is ticking…